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ON THE KNOWING INCLUSION OF UNENFORCEABLE
CONTRACT AND LEASE TERMS
Bailey Kuklin *
Contracts and leases commonly include terms that are unenforce-
able as contrary to common or statutory law.' Form documents, of-
fered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by retailers, manufacturers and
landlords, may include unenforceable provisions in a context in
which it is likely that the offeror is aware of the unenforceability. An
offeror may be tempted to include such terms on the rationale that
little may be lost and much might be gained. For if the offeree never
learns of his rights and a dispute arises, the offeror might gain an
advantage not otherwise obtainable, such as an immediate capitula-
tion by the offeree or a beneficial settlement. If the offeree does
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.S., 1963, University of Nebraska;J.D.,
1966, University of Michigan. For useful comments on prior drafts I wish to thank
Margaret Berger, Serge Gavronsky, Norman Poser and Robert L. Zimmerman. A
summer research stipend from the Brooklyn Law School, greatly appreciated, supported
the writing of this article.
1. Even after occasional revisions, traditional leases remain inconsistent
with the applicable statutes. For instance, N.Y. Multiple Dwelling Law
§ 302-a provides for rent abatement in the event that serious violations
go uncorrected for more than six months. Most traditional leases state
that no set-off or reduction of rent of any kind shall be allowed. N.Y.
Real Property Law § 259-c invalidates jury waiver clauses in leases insofar
as such clauses pertain to claims for personal injury or property damages.
Traditional form leases contain unqualified jury waivers.
Bentley, An Alternative Residential Lease, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 836, 837 n.10 (1974); see also
id. at 849 n.77, 851-52, 879 (liability disclaimer in traditional form lease probably voided
by statute; form lease deprives tenants of protections of law; statutory lease only effec-
tive remedy); Note, Preventing the Use of Unenforceable Provisions in Residential Leases, 64
CORNELL L. REV. 522, 522, 524 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Residential Leases] (lease
clause without legal effect still has practical effect; New York leases continue to contain
such unenforceable provisions) ; Note, Standard Form Leases in Wisconsin, 1966 Wis. L.
REv. 583, 592 (propriety of including invalid, unenforceable provisions in leases ap-
proved by Wisc. Real Estate Comm'n).
In a survey of landlord-tenant cases decided over a two-year period,
Professor Berger discovered that residential landlords continued to use
form leases even though they had lost over sixty per cent of the cases
involving the standarized agreements. Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law,
74 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 791-92 (1974); see also Kirby, Contract Law and the
Form Lease: Can Contract Law Provide the Answer?, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 204
(1976). Similarly, sellers continue to use warranty disclaimers in sales
contracts even though courts invalidate an overwhelming percentage of
such provisions. See Schwartz, The Private Law Treatment of Defective Prod-
ucts in Sales Situations, 49 IND. L.J. 8 (1973).
Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1070
n.35 (1977). What percentage of cases must a group lose before they "know" the term
in question is unenforceable? For a fuller discussion of one standard instance of the
problem, see the Appendix.
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learn, well, what can he do about it other than exercise the rights he
had anyway. Unless there is a specific statutory prohibition of' the
practice which provides an admonitory sanction, there is little to de-
ter the offeror. Common law actions are generally inadequate.
Moreover, the offeree who knows of his rights is not likely to suffer
significant actual damages, whereas the one who does not know or
learn of his rights is in no position to object. 2
This legal state of affairs is morally disquieting. It seems unfair
that one should knowingly take advantage of another's ignorance of
the law when, by including an unenforceable contract or lease term,
one is misleading the other into believing he is not ignorant. That
this conscious bluff exists may be presumed, for the usual assump-
tion regarding a written provision is that it is enforceable. Why else
would it be inserted by the knowledgeable offeror? The offeree is
thus less likely to resist the implicit assertion of the provision.3
This practice can be deterred by statutes with substantial penal-
ties. Some have been enacted. 4 Although there are common law
forms of action approaching the problem, each one fails as a general
solution. Even if one does provide a remedy, the relief is typically
2. The offeree who learns later of his rights may, in the meantime, have suffered
actual damages giving rise to common law relief. For a more detailed discussion, see
infra text accompanying notes 130-35 & 149-51. The percentage in this category is
probably small-small enough not to deter the continued practice by offerors.
3. "Uninformed or misinformed parties to a contract are easily terrorized or
disarmed into foregoing their rights and remedies .... Berger, supra note 1, at 815.
See also Note, Residential Leases, supra note 1, at 526-27 (tenants believe unenforceable
lease clauses are binding). Though I and others believe that tenants do have faith in the
enforceability of terms, and thus are less likely to resist them, this is difficult to
document. For some documentation, see Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An
Empirical Study, 69 MICH. L. REV. 247, 272-74 (1970). Against this intuitive idea is the
possibility that there exists such a cynical state of affairs that people standardly do not
believe the legitimacy of provisions included by a knowledgeable offeror. That such
cynicism may exist, see id. at 257. The social consequences of this condition are
discussed later. One would think, however, that the offeree's belief in the legitimacy of
inserted provisions grounds the reasoning process, along with the term's nuisance value
for settlement purposes, that induces the offeror to insert the unenforceable one.
Especially when the unenforceability is beyond debate, other reasons for including the
term are not evident. The one exception, and a complicating one it is, is where the
offeror includes the term as a means to challenge and overturn its unenforceability. For
further discussion, see "Growth of the Law," at 879-81 of text.
4. See, e.g., UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 1.403(b) (1972) ("If a
landlord deliberately uses a rental agreement containing provisions known by him to be
prohibited, the tenant may recover in addition to his actual damages an amount up to [3]
months' periodic rent and reasonable attorney's fees."); MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-
TENANT CODE § 3-404(2) (1969) (misdemeanor to include prohibited confession-of-
judgment clause); TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon 1986) (treble damages,
injunctive relief, court costs, and reasonable attorney's fees). That judicial innovation
may be more efficacious than legislation or public enforcement for a problem like ours,
see Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 49-51 (1974).
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too slight to admonish the offeror. Even punitive damages, because
of doctrinal restrictions, fall short of significant deterrence.
The problem under consideration is hardly cosmic. Society will
manage to muddle along despite the ongoing practice. Neverthe-
less, aspects of the question are intriguing and worth examining.
Foremost are interesting moral questions, private and public. 5 The
economic consequences (aren't they everywhere?) include an unu-
sual twist or two and provide a tidy example for close analysis. The
general repercussions to society of allowing or disallowing the prac-
tice touch upon a wide range of basic social values. Finally, on the
assumption that more can be said for than against a legal remedy, an
excursus into the historical principles of the actions of deceit and
prima facie tort, and the extraordinary remedy of punitive damages,
will show why no broad common law relief thus far has been forth-
coming. The forward-looking Restatements may portend a change
in the future. My aim is to explore this narrow problem from a
broad perspective as an exercise in comprehensive legal problem-
analysis.
I. PUBLIC POLICY
A. Ethics
Taking advantage of another's ignorance of the law, particularly
when one has encouraged it by providing implicit misinformation,
just does not sound morally proper. Morals, however, are not based
upon sound alone. This section discusses the general bases of pri-
vate morality and the specific application of them to our question.6
5. Thus, "[u]tilitarianism has always been discussed . . . in two different roles: on
the one hand as a theory of personal morality, and on the other as a theory of public
choice, or of the criteria applicable to public policy." UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 1, 1-2
(A. Sen & B. Williams eds. 1982) (Introduction by editors) (footnote omitted).
6. That the question occurs in the context of the marketplace, and therefore may be
considered a question of public rather than private morality, is not to be ignored. "To
argue, in the manner of Machiavelli, that there is one rule for business and another for
private life, is to open a door to an orgy of unscrupulousness before which the mind
recoils. To argue that there is no difference at all is to lay down a principle which few
men who have faced the difficulty in practice will be prepared to endorse as of invariable
application, and incidentally to expose the idea of morality itself to discredit by
subjecting it to an almost intolerable strain." R.H. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF
CAPITALISM 184 (1926) (quoted in MORALS AND VALUES 41 (M. Singer ed. 1977)). A
proper balance must be struck. As suggested by Tawney, "[a] free enterprise system not
founded upon personal morality will ultimately lose freedom." Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc.,
52 Misc. 2d 39, 54, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 321 (Sup. Ct. 1966). Within the marketplace,
whether an action is morally acceptable may depend upon the role of the actor. For
example, "it is illegal or immoral for a seller to conceal information but laudable for a
buyer to do so." S. MAITAL, MINDS, MARKETS, AND MONEY 7 (1982) (emphasis in original)
(citing A.C. PIGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 202 n. (1920)).
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1. General Discussion
Normative ethical theories fall into two broad categories: deontol-
ogy and teleology. 7 The dichotomy is based upon an age-old dis-
tinction between the "good" and the "just." Purely deontological
theories subordinate the good to the just and emphasize that one
must be just, i.e., do one's duty or accede to another's rights, even if
the result in the particular instance is that the good will be out-
weighed by the bad. The sheriff, therefore, is thought to carry out
his official duty justly when he unavoidably kills several persons in
putting down a lynch mob trying to hang a convicted murderer. Or,
if the serum to combat a worldwide, fatal epidemic can be obtained
only by sacrificing nonvoluntarily the one person with a natural im-
munity, humanity must perish. Duties and rights come first. Ex-
treme cases of "justice" such as these are said, not surprisingly, to
exemplify why purely deontological systems are controversial. 9
From another point of view, there remains a doubt whether, or to what extent,
morality ought to be brought to bear on social questions. It has a tendency to favor the
status quo, the powerful over the weak. SeeJ.L. MACKIE, HUME'S MORAL THEORY 154-56
(1980). Yet moral conflicts are inevitable, see Hampshire, Public and Private Morality, in
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 23-53 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978); F. KNIGHT, Science,
Philosophy, and Social Procedure, in FREEDOM AND REFORM 207-08 (1947). The resolutions
always require the sacrifice of some individual interests. See Strasnick, Individual Rights
and the Social Good A Choice-Theoretic Analysis, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 415 (1982). Turning
one's back to the sacrifice does not make it less bloody.
7. These labels are late upon the scene. They are introduced in C.D. BROAD, FIVE
TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY 162-64 (1930). The dichotomy may not be totally rigid. See
Sher, Antecedentialism, 94 ETHICS 6 (1983). Nor must one be in either one camp or the
other. Plato and Aristotle each had a foot in both. See J. HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 24-25 (1973) (with citations).
Absolutism [deontology] does not, of course, require one to ignore the
consequences of one's acts. It operates as a limitation on utilitarian
[teleological] reasoning, not as a substitute for it. An absolutist can be
expected to try to maximize good and minimize evil, so long as this does
not require him to transgress an absolute prohibition like that against
murder.
Nagel, War and Massacre, in WAR AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 3, 8 (M. Cohen, T. Nagel &
T. Scanlon eds. 1974). Finally, there may be hybrid ethical doctrines, such as rule-utili-
tarianism. See Sen, Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
113, 130-31 (1983). Smart was even able to interpret Kant, the supreme deontologist,
as a rule-utilitarian. See Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in JJ.C. SMART &
B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 3, 9 (1973). Certainly Kant noted con-
sequences. See infra note 28. For several possible combinations of deontology and tele-
ology, see R. NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 494-98 (1981).
8. Instead of "just," the idea may be expressed by such terms as "duty," "right,"
"obligation," or "ought." See W. FRANKENA, ETHICS 14-17 (2d ed. 1973); P.H. NOWELL-
SMITH, ETHICS 12-13 (1957).
9. See W. FRANKENA, supra note 8, at 30-32; W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD
17-19, 28 (1930). Perhaps the best known attempt at avoiding this type of consequence
originated with Ross who argued that one does not have absolute duties; rather, one has
only prima facie duties that can be overridden by other, conflicting duties. W. D. Ross,
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Teleological theories, on the other hand, subordinate the just to
the good.' 0 The greatest happiness (the "good") for the greatest
number of persons is a utilitarian expression of the general aim."
This version of teleology is known as hedonistic utilitarianism be-
cause it identifies the "good" with such concepts as "happiness,"
"pleasure," or "avoidance of pain," 12 all of them being aimed at
satisfactions. 13 The criminal conviction of innocent persons and ex-
treme penalties for minor transgressions can be defended using a
utilitarian calculus when the unhappiness of defendants is out-
supra, at 19-22, 28. But how does one measure the relative value of conflicting prima
facie duties? According to Ross, by internal reflection, not by a calculus aimed at a
maximization of the "good" or minimization of the "bad." Id. at 29-34. See R. BRANDT,
ETHICAL THEORY 392-93 (1959); P.H. NOWELL-SMITH, supra note 8, at 25-27; R. WOLFF,
UNDERSTANDING RAWLS 12 (1977).
10. SeeJ. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 24-26 (1971). In teleological theories, "the
good is defined independently from the right, and then the right is defined as that which
maximizes the good." Id. at 24 (footnote omitted). Bentham is the modern father of
utilitarianism, the most famous version of teleology. See S. TOULMIN, AN EXAMINATION OF
THE PLACE OF REASON IN ETHICS 195 (1950). J.S. Mill is his best known disciple.
Philosophers who preceded Bentham with similar ideas include Epicurus, Locke,
Hobbes, and Hume. See R. BRANDT, supra note 9, at 300-01.
11. Teleologists differ on the question of whose good it is that one ought to
try to promote. . . . 'Ethical universalism, or what is usually called
utilitarianism, takes the position that the ultimate end is the greatest
general good. . .' [as opposed to ethical egoism, which takes the position
that the greatest good is that of the person choosing to act].
W. FRANKENA, supra note 8, at 15 (emphasis in original). For variations of this utilitarian
idea, see, e.g., J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGIS-
LATION 11-13 (J. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds. 1970) (1st ed. Oxford 1789);J.S. MILL, Utili-
tarianism, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 1, 8 (1951) (1st
ed. London 1863). A variation mentioned before is rule-utilitarianism, see supra note 7,
which may be distinguished from act-utilitarianism. Rule-utilitarianism "emphasizes the
centrality of rules in morality and insists that we are generally, if not always, to tell what
to do in particular situations by appeal to a rule .... That is, the question is not which
action has the greatest utility, but which rule has." W. FRANKENA, supra, at 39 (emphasis in
original). Rule-utilitarianism has been attributed to J.S. Mill. See id. For modern exam-
ples, see, e.g., R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING (1981); S. TOULMIN, supra note 10, ch. 11.
For a devastating attack on the distinction, see generally D. LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF
UTILITARIANISM (1965).
12. For the advantages of this negative criterion over the positive ones, see S.I. BENN
& R.S. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 62-63 (1959).
13. See A.C. EWING, ETHICS 22 (1953). The distinctions among the "good" of
utilitarian theories may be fuzzy. Harsanyi, for one, proposes the modern approach
called "preference utilitarianism" which he dissociates from hedonistic utilitarianism.
See Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND,
supra note 5, at 39, 54. Preferences may not be hedonistic because, for example, one
may "prefer one thing to another where neither offers pleasure to anyone." Schick,
Under Vhich Descriptions?, in id. at 251, 251. Even among hedonistic utilitarian theories,
the views of the "good" may vary considerably. See generally R. BRANDT, supra note 9, at
300-31 (discussing theory of ethical hedonism, where "[a] thing is intrinsically desirable
(undesirable) if and only if and to the degree that it is pleasant (unpleasant)").
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weighed by the happiness (from deterred crime) of society. 14 An-
other position is: of equal value to other sources of happiness is a
person's malicious satisfaction at taking advantage of or harming an-
other person, despite the social unacceptability of such an act.' 5
These examples show what most would call moral defects in purely
consequentialist,16 utilitarian systems.' 7 To avoid these unsatisfac-
tory examples, among other reasons, some teleologists have
14. See M. GOLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 75-76 (1975); W.D. Ross, supra note 9, at
56-57. But see S.I. BENN & R.S. PETERS, supra note 12, at 216-21. Contented slavery is
also defensible. See MacDonald, The Language of Political Theory, in ESSAYS ON LOGIC AND
LANGUAGE 167, 182 (A. Flew ed. 1952 1st series). See also Harman, Human Flourishing,
Ethics, and Liberty, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 307, 314 (1983) ("[Act utilitarianism] implies that
a doctor is morally permitted, indeed required, to murder a relatively healthy patient (or
hospital visitor) if the doctor can use that person's vital organs to save the lives of at
least two people who would otherwise die.").
15. This conclusion has drawn fire from critics. See, e.g., G.E. MOORE, ETHICS 102
(1912); R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 83 (1981); see also Harsanyi, Rule
Utilitarianism, Equality, and Justice, 2:2 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 115, 116 (Spring 1985) (moral
problems posed by concept of social utility). For one utilitarian's unsatisfactory attempt
to defise this example, see Hare, Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND
BEYOND, supra note 5, at 30.
16. One of the leading modern utilitarians, J.J.C. Smart, begins an encyclopedic
exposition: "U[tilitarianism] can most generally be described as the doctrine which
states that the rightness or wrongness of actions is determined by the goodness and
badness of their consequences." Smart, Utilitarianism, in 8 ENCYLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
206, 206 (P. Edwards ed. 1967). See also Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics,
in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST, supra note 7, at 3, 9 ("Act-utilitarianism is the view
that the rightness or wrongness of an action is to be judged by the consequences, good
or bad, of the action itself."); Sen & Williams, Introduction.- Utilitarianism and Beyond, in
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra note 5, at 1, 3-4 ("Utilitarianism, in its central forms,
recommends a choice of actions on the basis of consequences, and an assessment of
consequences in terms of welfare."). But see Schick, Under Which Descriptions?, in id. at
251, 251-54. The term "consequentialist" may be criticized for its ambiguity. See
MacCormick, On Legal Decisions and Their Consequences: From Dewey to Dworkin, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 239, 241 n.3 (1983) (with citations).
17. Furthermore, "[i]f the term 'pleasure' is used by definition as a general
designation of all motive, the hedonistic principle is true by definition. And if this is not
done, if it is admitted to be possible for men to desire anything else than pleasure, then
the principle is axiomatically false, or incomplete." F. KNIGHT, Ethics and Economic
Reform, in FREEDOM AND REFORM, supra note 6, at 45, 75 n.15. Or, "[i]f every individual
universally and necessarily seeks his own maximum pleasure, it is hard to see sense in
saying that he ought to do so." F. KNIGHT, Freedom as Fact and Criterion, in id. at 1, 2 n. 1.
See also H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 154-55 (1958) (utilitarianism suffers a
dilemma of meaninglessness); R. BRANDT, supra note 9, at 314-15 (discusses, but rejects,
proposition that ethical hedonism is true by definition).
For brief summaries of the modern criticisms of utilitarian theory, see generally
H.L.A. HART, Between Utility and Rights, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 198,
200-02 (1983); Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
509, 510-11 (1980). Rawls' well-known criticism of utilitarianism is that it "does not
take seriously the distinction between persons." J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 27.
[Vol. 56
UNENFORCEABLE TERMS
adopted idealistic theories that advance nonhedonistic qualities as
those of intrinsic worth to be promoted.' 8
18. E.g., virtue, knowledge, life itself, aesthetic contemplation, friendship, traits of
character, being loved. See generally R. BRANDT, supra note 9, ch. 13 (discussing "things
worthwhile in themselves"). Brandt places Plato, Aristotle, Moore, Ross, and Rashdall,
among others, as advocates. Id. Even Mill has been read as an ideal utilitarian, see
Kilcullen, Utilitarianism and Virtue, 93 ETHICS 451 (1983), or at least as in an intermediate
position, see Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST, supra note 7, at 3, 13. On the various interpretations of Mill, see generally
Hoag, Happiness and Freedom: Recent Work on John Stuart Mill, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFI. 188
(1986). Posner advances wealth as the good to be maximized, see infra note 50. For a
more detailed taxonomy of teleological theories, see R. BRANDT, supra note 9, at 354-56.
Brandt's broad taxonomy distinguishes monistic from pluralistic theories, A monistic
one posits one property as having intrinsic value (the "good") while a pluralistic one
posits more than one property. Id. at 303. Hedonistic theories are basically monistic;
idealistic ones are usually pluralistic. Id.
Idealistic utilitarianism has not escaped the general criticism and troubling examples
leveled at all forms of consequentialist theories.
Undermined since 1951 by the disturbing consequences of Arrow's
Theorem [i.e., a paradox inheres in a social ordering of individual
preferences], utilitarianism is felt by many to have been done in by body
blows inflicted by Rawls and Nozick and Dworkin in the 1970s. At least in
the United States philosophers have felt that the hard core of moral
policy consists in respect for individual rights rather than pursuit of a
(perhaps indefinable) general interest ....
Lackey, A Modern Theory ofJust War, 92 ETHICS 533, 536 (1982). See also LIBERALISM AND
ITS CRITICS 1, 4-5, 7 (M. Sandel ed. 1984) (introduction by editor) (noting recent "as-
cendance of the rights-based ethic over the utilitarian one" within academic philoso-
phy). That there is life after death for utilitarianism, at least at the University of
Michigan, see, e.g., R. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT (1979); D. RE-
GAN, UTILITARIANISM AND Co-OPERATION (1980). While some are incanting its last rites,
a trend back towards utilitarian thought, or a synthesis with Kantianism, may be occur-
ring. See R. GOODIN, POLITICAL THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 15-17, 246 (1982).
To minimize the problems of settling upon the "good," "[w~riters in the liberal tradi-
tion, for example, Bruce Ackerman and Ronald Dworkin, argue persuasively that the
political decisions of a good society are as neutral as possible among conceptions of the
good life." Sagoff, Values and Preferences, 96 ETHICS 301, 310 (1986). See also M. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 1 (1982) ("deontological liberalism"); Fishkin,
Can There Be a Neutral Theory ofJustice?, 93 ETHICS 348 (1983) (comparison of theories of
Ackerman and Rawls); Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in UTILITARIANISM AND BE-
YOND, supra note 5, at 159, 160-61 (discussing conceptions of justice that "allow for a
plurality of differing and opposing, and even incommensurable, conceptions of the
good," and those that "hold that there is but one conception of the good"). This aim
for neutrality has given rise to the procedure-oriented normative political theories of
recent decades, including: B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980);
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); R. NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA
(1974); J. RAWLS, supra note 10. "[T]he more a society is divided on substantive values
the more precious as a means of preserving social peace is any agreement that can be
reached on procedure." B. BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 105 (1965). The modern disci-
pline of social choice theory attempts to cope with the openness of basic values. See
generally, e.g., D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION (1963). For criti-
cism of "proceduralism," see S. GORDON, WELFARE, JUSTICE, AND FREEDOM 16-17
(1980).
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Perhaps the apparent impossibility of reconciling atrocious cases
of acceptable practices under common normative theories with intu-
itively satisfactory conclusions has further encouraged moral philos-
ophers to attend to metaethics, the analysis of moral concepts and
the method of justifying normative positions, rather than the nor-
mative content itself.'9 Some conclude that ethical statements can-
not be verified. Noncognitivists, for example, may contend that
normative statements have no propositional content, no truth value;
such statements may express only the feelings or attitudes of the
speaker, or may be arguments or recommendations for action. 20
Still, the inquiry into normative ethics continues. It can hardly be
avoided. Whether or not any normative theory is watertight, we
mere mortals must nevertheless engage in morally loaded acts. Gui-
dance from philosophers is welcome. 2' Though both general cate-
gories of normative ethics may be, at least in the extreme, flawed,
there are important lessons to be learned from them that must be
incorporated into any justifiable decision to act, either as an individ-
ual or as a society. Surveying the ethical views of our problem will
identify "good reasons," if not conclusive reasons,22 for the appro-
19. See generally W. FRANKENA, supra note 8, at 95-116 (discussion of metaethics and
theories of justification).
20. See, e.g., A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (2d ed. 1946) (ethical
statements are expressions of emotion calculated to arouse feelings and stimulate
action); C. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944) (ethical statements reflect
speaker's attitude and are attempts to evoke similar attitude in listener); see generally R.
BRANDT, supra note 9, at 203-40 (examines noncognitivist theories, that (1) assert that
ethical utterances are best understood by likening them to some other functional
speech-type different from fact statements, and (2) deny that ethical terms are property-
referring).
21. Some philosophers deny they can guide us to a certain, moral destination, but
believe only that the trip itself is worth taking. "The study of ethics, according to the
classical conception, does not tell one what to do or furnish maxims for conduct; rather,
it forms the kind of person that one is-making one, for instance, more reflective, more
discriminating, more attentive-and it is only in this indirect way that it has an influence
upon practice." R. BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 144 (1983) (footnote omitted). "But
now it seems perfectly clear to me that the value of a moral philosophy lies less in the
conclusions it reaches (and the logic by which it reaches them) than in something which
it achieves as it goes along: something which I can only describe as illumination of moral
life." Gallie, Liberal Morality and Socialist Morality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY
116, 133 (P. Laslett ed. 1956 1st series). Yet, even a less sanguine opinion holds that for
moral philosophy, "[ilts primary value is the satisfaction of intellectual curiosity." E.F.
CARRITr, THE THEORY OF MORALS 71 (1928).
22. The "good reasons" or "all things considered" approach to normative ethics
and political theory is a twentieth century phenomenon stemming from the later
Wittgenstein. In the preface to Dworkin's latest book, for example, he reports: "The
distinctive structure and constraints of legal argument emerge, on this view, only when
we identify and distinguish the diverse and often competitive dimensions of political
value, the different strands woven together in the complex judgment that one
interpretation makes law's story better on the whole, all things considered, than any
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other can." R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE Vii (1986). For examples of other moral and
political works that take this general approach, see K. BAIER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW
(1958); J. RAWLS, supra note 10; M. SINGER, GENERALIZATION IN ETHICS (1961); S.
TOULMIN, supra note 10. This task is not easy. "Moral problems are notoriously complex
and difficult; and any philosophic theory that makes a serious attempt to come to grips
with them cannot fail to reflect these complexities." Harsanyi, supra note 15, at 115.
The discussion in this article goes beyond what is narrowly denominated by "moral."
It reflects this view:
If, on the other hand, we adopt a broader interpretation of 'morality,'
such that the justification of our conventions and commitments is itself a
moral issue, then we shall have great difficulty in marking off any set of
considerations as distinctively moral. I am inclined to think that, if we
abandon the restriction of 'morality' to the observance of commitments,
we shall find ourselves obliged in ethical thinking to take account of all
the reasons men may have for preferring one course of action to another.
Whiteley, On Duties, in MORAL CONCEPTS 53, 59 (J. Feinberg ed. 1969) (emphasis in
original). For other examples of this inclusive notion of "moral," see Broad, Conscience
and Conscientious Action, in id. at 74, 75; Davidson, How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?, in id.
at 93, 112; Rawls, Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics, 60 PHIL. REV. 177, 187-90
(1951); Wiggins, Deliberation and Practical Reason, in PRACTICAL REASONING 144, 146-47
(J. Raz ed. 1978) ("The man of highest practical wisdom is the man who brings to bear
upon a situation the greatest number of genuinely pertinent concerns and genuinely
relevant considerations commensurate with the importance of the deliberative con-
text."). Some philosophers, Kant and Sidgwick for example, equate morality to rational-
ity. See Gibbard, Moral Judgment and the Acceptance of Norms, 96 ETHICS 5, 9 (1985). See
generally Symposium on Rationality and Morality, 96 ETHICS 5 (1985) (characteristics of ra-
tionality and relationship of morality to rationality).
On the other hand, one must not pursue this search for "good reasons" too far:
"There is a general belief that the having a reason for all your actions is pedantic and
absurd. There is a general belief that to try to have reasons for all that you do is some-
times very dangerous .... First thoughts are often the best, and if once you begin to
argue with the devil you are in a perilous state." F.H. Bradley, My Station and Its Duties,
in MORALS AND VALUES 165, 168 (M. Singer ed. 1977). Moreover, "[t]he conditions for
pure ends-means rationality never exist. The habit of mind that yearns for these meth-
ods and their certainties is bound to be delusive, and ultimately-despite its claims to
superior rationality-to be irrational, because it will not be in accordance with the na-
ture of our world and our experience." J.B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow 24 (1985). Perhaps
our problem will resist resolution by "good reasons":
Moral consistency, however, is not always easy to achieve .... In our
private deliberations, reasons conflict, and there may be no simple proce-
dure that will yield a unique determination of 'the thing to do.'...
[T]here are situations in which not only are there reasons for and against
all the alternative courses but also the reasons will not assume an order-
ing such that these clearly override those; consequently, while one must
do something, whatever one does, one will simply have to disregard rea-
sons against doing it, and so do wrong.
Benn, Persons and Values: Reasons in Conflict and Moral Disagreement, 95 ETHICS 20, 22
(1984). See also S. CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 251 (1979) ("We have seen ... how
different are the ways in which the ordinary conduct of the ordinary human being can be
appealed to, or looked at, when one philosophizes about it; and how different the import
of various examples will be.").
Finally, one must not lose sight of the limitations of the search for good reasons when
judging others.
People come to accept certain rules and values in order to get along with
each other. The moral reasons a particular person has to act in one or
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priate public stance towards those who knowingly insert unenforce-
able terms. 23
another way depend ultimately on that person's values. To repeat, on
that person's values. . . . Nothing prevents us from using our values to
judge other people and other moralities. But we only fool ourselves if we
think our values give reasons to others who do not accept those values.
Harman, supra note 14, at 321 (emphasis in original).
23. Cicero cut through theory with a metaphorical description of the nature of our
problem. "Now wrongdoing originates in one of two ways: either by force or by
deception; deception is like a little fox, force like the lion. Both are most
uncharacteristic of man, but deception should arouse greater contempt." CICERO, DE
OFFIclIS 22-23 (H. Edinger trans. 1974). Dante, in his INFERNO, agreed with Cicero. See
S. BoK, LYING 43 (1978) ("But because fraud is an evil peculiar to man, it more
displeases God [than force does], and therefore the fraudulent are the lower, and more
pain assails them."); see also R. GOODIN, supra note 18, at 132-33 (fraud evokes more
resentment in man than does force).
"The devil-you will need no reminding-is the Prince of Lies." H. MORRIS, Lost
Innocence, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 139, 160 (1976). But is the deception of
knowingly unenforceable terms on a par with a direct lie?
The serpent's guile with Eve was no straightforward case of fraud. It is
not as if he outright lied to her, promising her something he knew she
would not get. He simply left out a few pertinent details of what she
would get in addition to what he told her she would. He was a subtle
salesman.
Id. at 161. For an inclusive definition of "lie," see Kupfer, The Moral Presumption Against
Lying, 36 REV. METAPHYSICS 103, 104 n.3 (1982). But see id. at 114-15 ("non-lying lin-
guistic deception"). MacCormick analyzes in detail the eight "ingredients of a success-
ful lie," lies being "one special case of deceit." MacCormick, What Is Wrong with Deceit?,
10 SYDNEY L. REV. 5, 8-11 (1982). For an interesting typology of deceptive practices, see
E. GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS 83-122 (1974).
The major religions have not been greatly concerned about the devil's claim to
princeship:
It certainly is quite striking that not one of the major religions, with the
exception of Zoroastrianism, has ever included lying as such among the
mortal sins. Not only is there no commandment: Thou shalt not lie (for
the commandment: Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neigh-
bor, is of course of a different nature), but it seems as though prior to
puritan morality nobody ever considered lies to be serious offenses.
H. ARENDT, supra note 17, at 278 n.35.
Putting the concerns for veracity into a positive voice, Polanyi said:
In an ideal free society each person would have perfect access to the
truth: to the truth in science, in art, religion and justice, both in public
and private life. But this is not practicable; each person can know directly
very little of truth and must trust others for the rest. Indeed, to assure
this process of mutual reliance is one of the main functions of society.
M. POLANVI, THE STUDY OF MAN 68 (1959). "Life requires lowering one's guard." H.
MORRIS, supra. "Especially in a modern highly specialised industrial or post-industrial
society, we human beings as rational agents are continually having to act in reliance on
the truth of information and advice we cannot directly check." MacCormick, supra, at 17.
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2. Deontology
Kant is the most famous espouser of deontology. 24 The supreme
principle of morality, according to him, is the categorical impera-
tive: one should act pursuant to a maxim that could be willed as a
universal law. "For it is a formal property of moral as of scientific
judgments, recognized in practice even by the unsophisticated, that
they hold without distinction of persons; the result is that an action
can be permissible for me only if it is permissible for anyone in my
situation." 2 5 Thus all persons, having autonomy of the will, are en-
titled to equal rights. They must be treated as ends in themselves
and not as means only to another's ends. 26
As applied to the knowing inclusion of unenforceable contract
terms, the conclusion seems swift and irresistible. Purposely mis-
leading another is using that person merely as a means for one's
own end of increased wealth. 27 One could hardly will misrepresen-
tation, express or implied, as a universal law, for then society would
tend to degenerate into a Hobbesianjungle of deceit and mistrust in
which promising would be meaningless. 28 This deception is similar
24. "The notion of duty does not play the central role in traditional that, it plays in
modern ethics and the notion of doing one's duty for duty's sake hardly appears before
Kant." P.H. NOWELL-SMITH, supra note 8, at 13. Kant's main ethical texts are: I. KANT,
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (Riga 1785) [hereinafter I. KANT,
GROUNDWORK] (Kant's second edition was translated by H. Paton also under the title
THE MORAL LAW (3d ed. 1956)); I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Riga 1788); I.
KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (J. Ladd trans. 1965) (1st ed.
Konigsberg 1797).
25. Walsh, IMMANUEL KANT, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 305, 317 (P. Edwards
ed. 1967). Walsh, a Kant scholar, provides no citation for this quote and I have not
turned up the idea expressed so directly in Kant's works. "What Kant has to say about
this Uustification of the universalizability principle] is by no means as clear as one could
wish, and what is clear is not very convincing." R. BRANDT supra note 9, at 29. Recall
that one form of utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism, also has a universalizability principle.
For more discussion, see supra note 11.
26. Boiling Kant's reasoning down to a single paragraph is unavoidably simplistic.
For greater refinement, see generally, R. BRANDT, supra note 9, at 27-35; W. FRANKENA,
supra note 8, at 30-33; Riley, On the "Kantian "Foundations of Robert Paul Wolff's Anarchism,
in ANARCHISM 294 (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1978).
27. I use the terms "mislead," "lie" and "deceit," and their cognates,
interchangeably. One might distinguish them. See Van Horne, Prolegomenon to a Theory of
Deception, 42 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 171, 172-73, 175-76 (1981). Under Van
Horne's distinctions, we are dealing with deliberate lies which are intended to, and
which often succeed in, deceiving the offeree. Our offeror is not merely an innocent
misleader.
28. "Lying is wrong because of what would happen if everyone lied." Singer, M'Ioral
Rules and Principles, in ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 160, 185 (A.I. Melden ed. 1958). See
also Gruzalski, Parfit's Impact on Utilitarianism, 96 ETHICS 760, 777 (1986) ("the Kantian
Test, 'What if everyone did that?' "). The point is not merely that more bad than good
would come from the universal maxim allowing lying, the teleological test, but rather
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to coercion in that it deprives others of the information needed to
exercise autonomous wills, to choose rationally for themselves. 29
One at least has a prima facie duty not to deceive another, virtually
always controlling in this context. 30
that such a maxim would give rise to a contradiction of will, would be inconsistent, self-
defeating. To put it in his own words:
'[C]ould I really say to myself that every one may make a false promise if
he finds himself in a difficulty from which he can extricate himself in no
other way?' I then become aware at once that I can indeed will to lie, but
I can by no means will a universal law of lying; for by such a law there
could properly be no promises at all, since it would be futile to profess a
will for future action to others who would not believe my profession or
who, if they did so over-hastily, would pay me back in like coin; and
consequently my maxim, as soon as it was made a universal law, would be
bound to annul itself.
1. KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 24, at 71 (footnote omitted).
29. "Deception, like coercion, is a form of manipulating the data on which a person
counts, in order to make him do what the deceiver wants him to do. Where it is
successful, the deceived becomes in the same manner the unwilling tool, serving another
man's ends without advancing his own." F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY
143-44 (1960).
When we accomplish our purposes through lies, it is not so much that
among the consequences of our action must be counted the fact that
another person entertains a false belief-after all, that may be trivial
enough-but rather that we have asserted that the mind, the rationality of
another, is available to us as the track on which the train of our purposes
may run.
C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 29 (1978). Feinberg sees it as a form "of exploitation, of one
party taking advantage of another, or promoting his own gain wrongfully at the expense
of his victim."J. FEINBERG, NoncomparativeJustice, in RIGHTSJUSTICE AND THE BOUNDS OF
LIBERTY 265, 269 (1980) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, "[e]xploitation leads nec-
essarily to unequal results that are in a way doubly unjust: the exploiter gets more than
he deserves and his victim less." Id. at 290-91. Fried puts the personhood of the victim
at stake by deceit. See C. Fried, supra, at 29, 83; see also S. BOK, supra note 23, at 18-22
(discussing deceit and violence as "two forms of deliberate assault on human beings");
Kupfer, supra note 23, at 115 ("Lying is disrespectful to the deceived by being a kind of
treachery."); MacCormick, supra note 23, at 15 ("disrespect"); O'Neill, Between Consenting
Adults, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 252, 260-66 (1985) (discussing Kantian account of treating
others as persons, as "ends in themselves"). Kant, on the other hand, was also con-
cerned with the deceiver's own self-dignity and self-contempt and the wrong done to all
of humanity. See Paton, An Alleged Right to Lie: A Problem in Kantian Ethics, 45 KANT-
STUDIEN 190, 195-96 (1953-54).
30. Kant claims that one's duty to be truthful is absolute. Even if a murderer is
seeking one's friend to kill him, one must truthfully respond to the question as to the
friend's whereabouts. Otherwise, if by some quirk the benevolent lie causes the
murderer to stumble upon and kill the friend, the liar is morally and legally(!)
responsible, whereas by telling the truth he is not. See I. Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie
from Altruistic Motives, in THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS IN
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 346 (L.W. Beck trans. 1949) (Berlin 1797). Other authors have
been unimpressed with Kant's rationalization. See, e.g., S. BOK, supra note 23, at 39
("obsessive"); Barry, And Who Is Mil, Aeighbor?, 88 YALE L.J. 629, 644-45 (1979) (no
"soul" in this position of Kant and Fried). Perhaps, however, Kant was mistakenly and
intemperately backed into this position during his declining years when he had a
consistent way out. See Paton, supra note 29, at 193-98; see also W. FRANKENA, supra note
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One deontological argument may be elicited to resist this hard
and fast conclusion against misrepresenting by means of a mislead-
ing term. The offeree, as a rational person, by signing the contract
without clearly understanding the purport and standing of each
term, "consents" to the consequences. 3 ' Against this it can be
pointed out that it typically is rational to sign the agreement without
full comprehension. As elaborated later, 32 the information costs
and the difficulty, even futility, of dickering over the take-it-or-leave-
it contract often outweigh the advantage of the potential revision in
light of the low probability of a future, relevant dispute. It would
8, at 32 ("Possibly Kant could argue... [that] one can will the maxim, 'When breaking a
promise is required in order to help someone I will break it,' to be universally acted on
in the situations specified, especially if it is also specified in the maxim that the promise
is not crucially important and that the help is.").
Kant's argument is consequentialist, of a sort. Tell the truth because if you don't, and
the fates are cruel, you must pay for what follows. Truth or consequences. It may seem
strange to hear this defense from Kant, the classical deontologist. This is not the only
place he takes notice of the results of doing one's duty or even the results in determining
one's duty. See, e.g., I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 24, at
104. Kant did not entirely divorce his principles from consequentialism, see R. DWORKIN,
Is Wealth a Value?, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 237, 251, 411 n.10 (1985), or from
utilitarian or teleological thinking, see H. ARENDT, supra note 17, at 155-56; Paton, supra,
at 196. But see W. FRANKENA, supra note 8, at 31. Consequences may also come into a
deontological position at another point, that is, in measuring degrees of wrongdoing:
"by its [deceit's] ulterior consequences, especially those in the intention and foresight of
the deceiver, shall we judge of its seriousness as a wrong." MacCormick, supra note 23,
at 19.
But ours is an easier problem. One must labor hard to imagine a situation in which
there would be a duty that overrides the moral rule, prima facie at a minimum, that one
must not mislead another by including knowingly an unenforceable contract term.
Perhaps there might be a situation in which the life of one's mother depends upon
gaining an advantage by this deception. I leave it to you to fill in the details. Kant, the
absolutist, ignoring the arguments of Paton and Frankena, supra, would say good-bye to
his mother. I believe mothers are not at stake in the example in the Appendix.
31. I use scare quotes to indicate my agreement with Llewellyn in nay-saying
Holmes: "Here, however, one must dissent vigorously from Holmes' incautious dictum:
'As the relation of contractor and contractee is voluntary, the consequences attaching to
that relation must be voluntary.' THE COMMON LAW 302 (1923)." Llewellyn, IRhat Price
Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 730 n.56 (1931).
An initial difficulty is that it is unclear what constitutes consent. In legal
and institutional contexts the criteria are supposedly clearest. Here
formal procedures supposedly show who consents to which actions by
which others. But here too presumptions of consent are defeasible. Even
the clearest formulas of consent, such as signatures and formal oaths,
may not indicate consent when there is ignorance, duress,
misrepresentation, pressure, or the like. Such circumstances may void
contracts and even nullify marriages. Formal procedures for consenting
may reveal only spurious consent. ...
O'Neill, supra note 29, at 254-55 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 256-60 (discussing
theories of actual consent, hypothetical consent, significant and spurious consent, and
possible consent).
32. For further discussion, see "Economic Analysis" at 861-69 of text.
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then be rational to "consent." For the law not to recognize this is to
force the offeree either to act irrationally or to forego legal rights by
default.33 Even if the offeree "consents," the question remains
whether it is just to allow the offeror to use the offeree, however
unworthy of public protection he may be considered, as a means
only to his end. 34 In resolving these conflicting universalized princi-
ples, the common law has favored the offeree on the grounds that it
is better to protect the foolish than to encourage the
unscrupulous.3 5
33. Thus the usual consumer-merchant transaction does not involve the
prototypical, arms-length bargaining often presumed to take place in the marketplace.
If it did the moral stance would be affected. For in "fair" negotiations, a certain amount
of "puffing and avoidance" is expected. See infra note 86. "The fact that such behavior
is both expected and transparent seems to mitigate the moral wrong of lying." Luban,
Bargaining and Compromise: Recent Work on Negotiation and Informal Justice, 14 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 397, 406 (1985). But even for the prototype, "outcome fairness" is called for. Id.
at 407-10. In our circumstances, that some offerors take undue advantage of their
relative position of power is to be expected. That this expectation is to supply a moral
warrant for the offeror's practice when it is irrational or inefficient for the offeree to
resist is doubtful. No acceptable, universalizable maxim in support of the offeror comes
to mind.
34. The fact of B's voluntary consent to the risk in these examples, however,
does not automatically relieve A of all responsibility for subsequent
harms to B. It is at least a somewhat disingenuous reply to criticism for A
to say, 'B brought it all upon himself. I was a mere passive instrument of
his will,' ...... [E]xploitation of another's rashness or foolishness is wrong,
even when, because of prior voluntary consent, it does not violate the
other's right, it does not wrong him, and it does not treat him unjustly. It
is wrong because the actor (A) believes on good evidence that it will
probably cause harm to B, and deliberately harming another to one's own
gain is something we ought not to do, even though the other can have no
grievance against us.
Feinberg, Noncoercive Exploitation, in PATERNALISM 201, 205 (R. Sartorius ed. 1983) (em-
phasis in original). Feinberg develops this argument at length and the rationale for gov-
ernment intervention, id. at 219-32.
35. See, e.g., Chamberlin v. Fuller, 59 Vt. 247, 256, 9 A. 832, 836 (1887) ("No rogue
should enjoy his ill-gotten plunder for the simple reason that his victim is by chance a
fool."); Kendall v. Wilson, 41 Vt. 567, 571 (1869) ("[T]he law will afford relief even to
the simple and credulous who have been duped by art and falsehood."); RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS § 471 comment i (1932); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 162 comment c (1979) ("One who preys upon another's idiosyncrasies cannot
complain if the contract is held voidable when he succeeds in what he is endeavoring to
accomplish."). Even that rugged individualist, Richard Epstein, notes that "the
carelessness of a victim does not excuse, much less justify, the perpetration of fraud."
Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 298 (1975). See also
Johnson, The Idea of Autonomy and the Foundations of Contractual Liability, 2 LAW & PHIL.
271, 299-300 (1983) (ways in which "strings" are attached to legal enforcement of
promises).
One other deontological argument supporting deceit might be mentioned in passing.
A product of a deontological orientation is the natural rights theories that have been so
influential in political theory. Starting from a natural rights position in the Hobbesian
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3. Teleology
Deriving conclusions from teleological theories regarding the vir-
tues of providing relief from unenforceable terms is not as quick as
from deontological theories.36 For if the good of the offeror and
others outweighs the bad of the offeree and others, the balance is
struck in favor of this form of misrepresentation.37 How does one
measure this relative good? Most commentators, especially econo-
mists, argue that one cannot make these interpersonal utility
comparisons. 38
jungle, one may find a right to deceive. Spinoza did. Discussing Spinoza's contention,
Friedrich stated:
Spinoza is relentless in this respect: Everyone has by nature a right to act
deceitfully (dolo) nor is he bound to observe a contract, except by the
hope of a greater good or the fear of a greater evil than would result from
the breaking of the contract! This follows inexorably from the premise
that everyone's right extends as far as his power.
C.J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE 43 (1957). Spinoza thought that by
surrendering their power to a democracy, the form of government most consonant with
individual liberty, people become obligated to fulfill the commands of the state, and thus
may be prohibited from deceitful actions. Id.
36. Mr. Utilitarian, in his uniquely infelicitous manner, said: "Falsehood, take it by
itself, consider it as not being accompanied by any other material circumstances, nor
therefore productive of any material effects, can never, upon the principle of utility,
constitute any offense at all."J. BENTHAM, supra note 11 (quoted in S. BOK, supra note 23,
at 47). See generally S. BOx, id. at 47-56 (with citations) (discussing role of weighing
consequences to justify falsehoods in various systems of ethics).
37. This may be true even if we were to ignore the offeror's malicious satisfaction.
For more discussion of this point, see supra note 15. Egoistic theories may be
considered briefly. According to Brandt the egoistic principle is: "A person is obligated
over all to perform an action A if and only if A is, among all the actions he can perform,
the one that will produce states of himself of maximum intrinsic worth." R. BRANDT,
supra note 9, at 369. Brandt concludes that the egoistic theory is mistaken even though
Plato and Hobbes were among its subscribers. Id. at 369-75; see also W. FRANKENA, supra
note 8, at 17-23 (discussing contradictions and difficulties of egoism); Gauthier, The
Incompleat Egoist, in 5 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 65, 119 (S.M. McMurrin
ed. 1984) (direct application of egoistic moral choice theory without appreciation of
value of social cooperation is self-defeating). Rawls believes rational egoism "is really
not a moral conception at all, but rather a challenge to all such conceptions." Rawls,
Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77J. PHIL. 515, 556 (1980). Western civilization
has generally embraced altruism as opposed to egoism. See K. POPPER, THE OPEN
SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 99-101 (1950). If egoism is adopted, it is clear that from the
offeror's viewpoint, unenforceable terms are defensible (so long as the negative
repercussions to him are not offsetting).
For a discussion of the traps for utilitarians in weighing the consequences of lies, see
S. BOK, supra note 23, at 47-56.
38. How can one person know and value the mental state of another? See, e.g., K.
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 9 (2d ed. 1963) ("[i]nterpersonal
comparison of utilities has no meaning and, in fact .... there is no meaning relevant to
welfare comparisons in the measurability of individual utility"). But see P.S. ATIYAH,
PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 132 (1981); B. BARRY, supra note 18, at 44-52; R. GOODIN,
supra note 18, at 15-18, 247; Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra note 5, at 39, 49-52; Mirrlees, The Economic Uses of
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From even this brief exposition of teleology, it should be clear
that one cannot deduce from the premises of most versions any ir-
refutable conclusions regarding the social desirability of knowingly
including unenforceable terms. To the extent the good is, say, an
idealistic trait of character such as "virtue" or "benevolence," one
might indeed conclude that unenforceable terms are improper. But
when the good is hedonistic or is such as "knowledge" or "friend-
ship," no conclusion is self-evident.3 9 Similarly, there is no obvious
conclusion when the "good" is pluralistic. Even if one found a con-
crete yardstick by which to measure the "good," the tradeoffs are an
empirical matter.40 Thus the ultimate teleological conclusion is in-
Utilitarianism, in id. at 63, 70-74; Pennock, Epilogue: Some Perplexities Further Considered, in
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 408, 414-15 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1983). Hence the
fashion of such theories as Paretianism which finesse the need for interpersonal utility
comparisons. See A. BUCHANAN, ETHICS, EFFICIENCY, AND THE MARKET 7-8 (1985). But see
Coleman, The Economic Analysis of Law, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 83, 85 (J.
Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1982). Compare Rawls' "difference principle" which rules
out the gambit of making the least advantaged persons worse off by a rule change. SeeJ.
Rawls, supra note 10, at 75-83.
39. "In ethical statements we never get beyond relative, vague, qualitative
comparisons." M. SCHLICK, PROBLEMS OF ETHICS 76 (1939). "Another problem is the
lack of a method for calculating the effect of a decision or policy on the total happiness
of the relevant population." R. POSNER, supra note 15, at 54 (footnote omitted).
40. Bok discusses a range of situations of lying in general with actual and
hypothetical examples. Still, her conclusions are empirical and conjectural.
Throughout her work she relies extensively on these consequentialist arguments. For
example, no matter how confident the liar is that the deceit, benevolent or malicious,
will be undetected, to the regret of the liar the lie may become known, or, the effect of
the practice of deceit on the liar's personality or identity may be deleterious. See, e.g., S.
BOK, supra note 23, at 24-28, 60-61, 63-65, 79, 119-21, 127, 132, 195-97. Kupfer also
worries about harmful effects, including the threat to "the integration of the liar's
personality." Kupfer, supra note 23, at 103. This concern
is not obviously of the utilitarian stripe.... Character is not a momentary
plus or minus to be weighed against other moments of positive or
negative interest. Rather, considerations of character illuminate what we
are as people; they penetrate to the level of identity. We might say that
they unite the ontological and moral realms by taking a stand on.what
way of being is itself good.
Id. at 113. "In Kantian language, loss of personality integration makes one less a mem-
ber of the Kingdom of Ends: less able to originate his own ends and share in those of
others; less able to formulate principles and then act on them." Id. at 124.
None of this is to say there isn't the "truth which is of Satan." S. BOK, supra, at 284.
Lies, some white ones, for example, have their place. See id. at 57-72; Kupfer, supra at
113-14. Perhaps a white lie isn't even a "lie." See id. at 109. When the truth may hurt
another, it may be one's duty not to tell it. See Olson, Sincerity and the Moral Life, 68
ETHICS 260, 274-75 (1958). Is this the reasoning that led the Emperor Frederick Barba-
rossa to his maxim: "He that knows not how to dissemble knows not how to live"? See R.
BURTON, THE ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY 272 (F. Dell & P. Jordan-Smith eds. 1927) (1 st
ed. Oxford 1621).
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determinate by thought experiment alone. 4' Although one would
expect (and hope) teleologists to disfavor the dishonest aspects of
the knowing inclusion of unenforceable terms, some may coherently
conclude there are net advantages to the contrary.
There is one fashionable body of knowledge, akin to utilitarian-
ism, in which guidance may be found: the microeconomic analysis of
law and economics. 42 Although economists historically have backed
away from normative arguments, today's best known legally-ori-
ented spokesperson, Richard Posner, has embraced the notion that
the legal system ought to aim at maximizing wealth. 43 The teleolog-
ical "good," in other words, is wealth. Even without this normative
leap of faith, microeconomic analysis can put into sharper focus the
values and tradeoffs at stake when deciding whether to proscribe the
practice in question.4 4
B. Economic Analysis
An economic analysis of transactions of the type here considered
in which unenforceable terms are knowingly included in contracts,
41. This is true of rule-utilitarianism as well as act-utilitarianism. See supra note 11.
Whether, for the former, the universalization of the rule against knowingly including
unenforceable terms will maximize the "good" remains an empirical question subject, in
principle, to debate. The analysis that follows supports (nonconclusively) the rule.
42. "[U]tilitarianism ... virtually reduce[s] all ethics to economics." F. Knight, Some
Notes on the Economic Interpretation of History, in FREEDOM AND REFORM, supra note 6, at 246,
251 n.4. "Bentham's utilitarianism, in its aspect as a positive theory of human behavior,
is another name for economic theory." R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 357
(1972). See also Lyons, Utility and Rights, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW, supra note
38, at 107-08 (normative positions of economists are similar to those found within
utilitarian tradition). But see Coleman, The Economic Analysis of Law, in id. at 83; Coleman,
The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard Posner's The Economics
of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1110 (1982); Rothbard, Comment: The Myth of Efficiency,
in TIME, UNCERTAINTY, AND DISEQUILIBRIUM 90, 95 (MJ. Rizzo ed. 1979) ("Efficiency can
never serve as the basis for ethics; on the contrary, ethics must be the guide and
touchstone for any consideration of efficiency. Ethics is the primary.").
43. See R. POSNER, supra note 15, at 60-115; Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the
Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980); Posner,
Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979). Posner has been
extensively criticized for his normative position. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 42, at
1105 (criticism of Posner's views); Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 485 (1980) (justifying and criticizing economic approach to legal and social
decision making).
44. Yet caution is required, for economism, in light of its imperfections and
simplifications, "simply ignores the most important facts about its material." F. KNIGHT,
Fact and Value in Social Science, in FREEDOM AND REFORM, supra note 6, at 225, 237. The
justification of cost-benefit analysis is in doubt. See Copp, Morality, Reason, and
Management Science: The Rationale of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2:2 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 128
(Spring 1985). Nonetheless, it (they?) remains in fashion. For an interesting discussion
of the economics of deceit in the political context, see G. TULLOCK, TOWARD A
MATHEMATICS OF POLITICS 133-43 (1967).
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argues generally for providing legal relief. The practice is
inefficient.
Among the givens for an ideally efficient market is that the parties
have perfect information. 45 That, by supposition, does not exist in
the paradigmatic circumstance. Although both sides may be imper-
fectly informed, one side knows more about the contract terms than
the other and exploits this differential. The offeror who regularly
engages in similar transactions knows or has reason to know the ap-
plicable law while the offeree, an occasional consumer of the of-
feror's goods, presumably does not. It is the suspicion that the
offeree is ignorant that would seem to induce the offeror to include
the term. And it is the offeree's knowledge that he is ignorant and
his belief that the offeror is not that inclines the offeree to rely upon
the implicit assertion of the enforceability of the term.46
Perfect information supports the economic goal of Pareto op-
timality. The Pareto optimal condition exists when resources are
allocated efficiently, that is, in such a manner that no person can
enter a transaction which will make him better off without making
some other person worse off.47 Each person is the best judge of
what makes himself better off.48 Tojudge, one must be informed of
the true costs of each choice. That is likely to happen most cheaply
if the price of the goods being considered accurately reflects their
costs. In the usual case of an unenforceable term, accurate pricing
will not occur.
If the offeree is disinclined to rely upon the offeror's implied as-
sertion of law, he may either undertake to obtain the information,
decline the transaction, or, despite the disinclination, assume the
45. Along with zero transaction costs, Buchanan includes in the "description of the
conditions that define the ideal market and that ensure that exchanges result in a Pareto
Optimal equilibrium state": "1. Full information is available about the performance and
quality of goods and services and the costs of all alternative ways of producing them, and
the cost of this information is zero." A. BUCHANAN, supra note 38, at 14.
46. The sixth of MacCormick's eight ingredients for a successful lie, see MacCormick,
supra note 23, "follows from the fact that different people have different ranges of
information and expertise available to them. . . . One condition of a hearer taking
seriously and deciding to believe what a speaker says to him is that he believes the
speaker has this authority of superior knowledge." Id. at 10 ("authority condition").
47. For discussions of Pareto optimality and how it differs from the various meanings
of efficiency, Pareto superiority, and related 'concepts, see A. BUCHANAN, supra note 38,
at 4-13; Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange and Auction: Philosophic Aspects ofthe Economic Approach
to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 221, 226-31 (1980); Coleman, supra note 17, at 512-13.
48. See, e.g., B. SPINOZA, ETHICS Part IV, Prop. XXXVII, Note II, at 213 (R.H.M.
Elwes trans. 1883) (1st ed. Amsterdam 1677) ("by sovereign natural right every man
judges what is good and what is bad, [and] takes care of his own advantage according to
his own disposition"). This supposition as incorporated into Pareto optimality
supposedly avoids the difficulties of interpersonal utility comparison. See supra note 38.
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risk of his ignorance. The investment to obtain the information in-
creases the transaction costs. 4 9 The refusal to transact is nonop-
timal if the offeree, when fully informed, would prefer to purchase
the goods.50 The assumption of risk is inefficient ex post to the ex-
tent that the risk proves more costly than the cost of obtaining the
information before making the initial choice whether to purchase. 5'
Unless there is a fortuitous congruence of reactions and counter-
reactions, the market operates less ideally than it would if the prac-
tice in question is disallowed. 52
49. Transaction costs are the costs of effecting a transfer of rights from one party to
another. See A. BUCHANAN, supra note 38, at 126. Since, as pointed out in the next
paragraph, the offeror can obtain the information more cheaply than the offeree, the
additional transaction costs can be reduced by disallowing the offeror from inserting
misleading terms.
50. Most of the conventional pieties-keeping promises, telling the truth,
and the like-can also be derived from the wealth-maximization
principle. Adherence to these virtues facilitates transactions and so
promotes trade and hence wealth by reducing the costs of policing
markets through self-protection, detailed contracts, litigation, and so on.
R. POSNER, supra note 15, at 67 (footnote omitted).
51. If the unenforceable term does not come into operation and thereby proves
irrelevant to the offeree, assuming the risk of ignorance regarding the enforceability
turns out to be efficient ex post. The information, costly to obtain, has no payoff (for
this transaction). The more the offeree can reasonably rely upon the offeror not to
include unenforceable terms, the lower is the cost ex ante of assuming the risk of such
terms; there is less risk. When offerees are ignorant of particular unenforceable terms,
their relative optimism or pessimism as a class about the risks allocated by whatever
unenforceable terms there may be will affect the offerors' decisions as to pricing and
whether to include such terms. See Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for
Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1390-
91 (1983).
52. In one sense, the market operates nonideally by definition whenever one of the
parties is not fully informed or must assume costs to become informed. For further
discussion, see supra note 45. On the other hand, the transaction may still be Pareto
superior if the offeree chooses correctly based upon the eventualities. For example, if
one buys "a pig in the poke" and it turns out that if fully informed of the contents one
would have made the same purchase, then the transaction is Pareto superior though it
occurs in a nonideal market; the offeree is better off, as is the offeror by supposition, and
no one is worse off. See supra note 47.
Imperfect information that may affect contract terms occurs in three
forms. First, consumers may be uninformed about the risks that these
terms allocate, making them unable to choose terms that correctly reflect
their preferences. Firms are said to exploit this ignorance by degrading
contract quality .... Second, consumers may be unaware of the array of
prices and terms that the firms in a market can offer. Consumirs who
lack this information may accept poor bargains because they do not know
that better ones exist, and firms consequently will have little incentive to
offer better deals because these will not increase sales. Third, consumers
may not understand the legal relationships that their purchase contracts
create because they do not read the language in those contracts. Firms
have an incentive to exploit this ignorance by using 'hidden' terms that
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Even if the offeror himself is originally uninformed of the relevant
law, it is often efficient to impose upon him the legal duty to obtain
the information and pass it along to the offeree. 53 He is typically a
professional businessperson regularly entering into similar con-
tracts. 54 Hence, he may well need the information for himself,
will disadvantage consumers if circumstances cause these terms to be
invoked.
Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 51, at 1389. The authors doubt the third problem is as bad
as it might first seem since "if consumers who care enough about purchase choices to
shop for favorable deals know the term at issue and if there are enough such consumers,
markets will respond as if all consumers were aware of that term." Id. at 1390 n. 1. First,
are there enough of such consumers? If there are, one might suppose our problem of
unenforceable terms would not exist. That the problem does exist implies that there are
not enough these consumers, and that there is not the fortuitous congruence of events
necessary to make the market efficient by eliminating the practice. Second, the markets
for particular goods may be sharply separated; the market appealing to the educated
consumer may hardly overlap the one appealing to the uneducated.
As Adam Smith and David Hume pointed out 200 years ago, there is a
strong rule utilitarian argument for this configuration of the law [regard-
ing deceit], peculiarly adapted to commercial as distinct from pastoral or
agrarian societies. Market economies involve large scale and impersonal
transactions between relative strangers. It is therefore especially impor-
tant that the law provide some guarantee of, and some incentive to, trust-
worthiness in commercial dealings.
MacCormick, supra note 23, at 16 (footnotes omitted).
53. We need not worry about the "shrewd bargainer" who, if he must disclose
information, would be discouraged from investing resources into acquiring it. See R.
POSNER, supra note 15, at 234-44; see also Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the
Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13-14 (1978) ("deliberately acquired information,"
unlike "casually acquired information," will be produced less if possessor is denied
benefits of using it). Posner worries about cases of the ilk of the land purchaser who
alone knows of the minerals hidden beneath the surface. If he can not exploit that
knowledge as against the seller, he will not bother to gain it and wealth may be lost to
society. In our case there is no social wealth to be lost by forbidding unenforceable
terms. Quite to the contrary.
For the reasons that follow in the text, the merchant will not be discouraged from
developing the informational resource. Kronman goes further to argue that one may
exploit private information if that would make the class of the uninformed better off in
the long run. See Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE LJ. 472, 492
(1980). Analysis of our situation supports disclosure on this ground. Criticizing this
analysis of Kronman's as contradictory (while pointing to resolutions) is Baker, Starting
Points in Economic Analysis of Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 939, 969-70 (1980).
Even Fried, the Kantian, worries about protecting the shrewd bargainer. See Fried,
Correspondence, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 265 (1982) (approving a case which upheld a
purchase for $18,000 of mining rights worth $100,000,000). "So long as both parties
are aware of this availability [of expensive geological surveys], this aspect of 'caveat
emptor' (or vendor) is not only efficient, it is fair and thus in accordance with any
reasonably common morality .... What is not covered are cases in which the convention
favors disclosure . . ." Id. at 266. The convention today seems not to favor the
disclosure of unenforceable terms. Still, ought it?
54. These efficiency arguments exclude the cases in which the offeror and offeree are
equally uninformed and the offeror is not in the usual business of the particular
transaction. On the other hand, these and the other arguments apply when it is the
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whether or not he must reveal it to the consumer, to make his own
rational business choices. Upon once learning the applicable law he
can pass along this information to all his offerees and thereby amor-
tize the cost of the information among many transactions. The of-
feree, by supposition, enters few comparable transactions over
which to amortize his information costs. 55
Initially obtaining the information regarding the unenforceable
term may usually be done more cheaply by the offeror than the of-
feree. The offeror may have an attorney on retainer or as an em-
ployee. He may be a member of a trade association or other
business group that makes this information readily available. The
first dispute over the term will make the status of it clear to the of-
feror. The offeree, on the other hand, will have none of these con-
veniences and must make a more concerted effort to become
properly informed. 56
businessperson-offeree who supplies the form document to the occasional, uninformed
offeror. The labels "offeror" and "offeree" here are expository conventions only.
55. A consumer makes many transactions over the course of a life and is on
close terms with others who engage in commercial activity. Hence,
consumers can develop considerable knowledge about contract content if
there is overlap in the legal substance of the contracts that these
consumers make. Such overlap seemingly exists. For example, purchase
money security interests and repair and replacement warranty clauses
assume similar forms in both sales of cars and sales of refrigerators. It
therefore seems plausible to suppose that most consumers know what the
important terms in their contracts achieve.
Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 51, at 1390 n.l; see also id. at 1431-34 (discussing ability of
consumers to obtain information regarding goods). In my forty-five years I have
purchased (a doubtlessly below-average) three new cars and one new refrigerator. As I
faintly recall, none of the three cars had similar warranties. Though there must have
been one, I have no idea what my refrigerator warranty was like. Furthermore, although
I suppose I have done it, I have no recollection of speaking to my friends or colleagues
about car or refrigerator warranties. What's been your experience? How many years (of
purchases in ignorance?) did it take you to achieve it?
56. "Legal rules that facilitate bargaining, or that reduce the cost of drafting
agreements [here, reduced information costs], would also be recommended by
allocative efficiency as both parties to the contract benefit from the reduced transaction
costs." Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 591, 608 (1980). In our case this presumably is not true, or the offeror does not
benefit as much as he can by inserting an unenforceable term, otherwise, why would the
offeror insert it? Let us change the presumed facts slightly. If offerees are so skeptical
about the offerors' terms that they regularly make the expenditures to obtain accurate
information, then the rational offeror, in the absence of a freerider-type problem, would
stop the practice in order to lower overall transaction costs. The "freerider" problem
arises since some offerors would refrain from revising their practice to take advantage of
the higher credibility established by the other offerors who alter their practice of
inserting unenforceable terms. Hence the "freeriders" would inhibit the revision of the
practice in question.
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The reasoning of the misleading offeror in pricing his goods will
lead to cost inaccuracies. On the one hand, the offeror may pass
along to the offeree some or all of the payoffs from including the
unenforceable term. He will estimate the proportion of offerees
who will be misled by and rely upon the unenforceable term to the
advantage of the offeror. The detrimental reliance will lower his
costs. This allows him to reduce the price of the goods. The decep-
tively low price when compared to substitute goods will increase his
sales volume. 57 By this means his profit increases.
On the other hand, the offeror may choose not to lower the price
of the goods even though some offerees will be misled into forego-
ing rights. Additional profit to the offeror then comes from the
value to him of the foregone rights rather than from increased
volume.
The end result of the offeror's pricing choice depends upon the
ultimate knowledge of the offerees. There are several possibilities.
The least complicated cases occur where the offerees are either ini-
tially knowledgeable regarding the law or, unbeknownst to them,
remain ignorant of the law throughout the interaction with the of-
feror. There are also instances in which the offerees deliberately
assume the risk of their known ignorance or in which they obtain the
knowledge of unenforceability sometime during a dispute. Depend-
ing upon the circumstances and the strategies of the parties, the al-
locative impact is manifold. The simplest two cases will serve as
examples.
First, when the offeror lowers the price to reflect partially his ex-
pected savings from foregone rights, those offerees who costlessly
know of their rights will purchase too many of the goods. The rea-
son for lowering the price does not apply to them and thus the
goods are cheaper to them than is their true cost. At the same time,
the offerees who remain unconsciously ignorant throughout will
purchase fewer of the goods than their true value with the unen-
forceable term would dictate, but nevertheless will purchase more of
these goods than of substitute goods otherwise competitively
priced. Resources are misallocated. Furthermore, there are distrib-
utive consequences. The ignorant purchasers effectively subsidize
the knowledgeable ones. Wealth is also shifted from the ignorant
purchasers and from sellers of substitute goods to the offeror.
57. A substitute good is a commodity that is related to the primary good and can be
used as an alternative to the primary good. See E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS:
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 107-10 (shorter 3d ed. 1979). Here the substitute goods
include the identical goods available elsewhere without a contract including the
unenforceable term.
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In the second case, where the offeror does not lower the price of
the goods to reflect anticipated savings, the knowledgeable offerees
will purchase the proper amount of goods whereas the offerees who
remain unconsciously ignorant throughout will purchase even fewer
of the goods than in the first case above. They still fail to add into
the net cost of the goods the value to them of the unknown rights.
Some of these latter offerees will purchase substitute goods instead,
for they misperceive the actual value of the offeror's goods. Again,
resources are misallocated. Distributively, wealth is shifted from the
ignorant purchasers to the offerors and to the sellers of substitute
goods. In this case and all others it is far from clear that the distrib-
utive consequences are socially desirable.58
The reputable offeror, in a market otherwise ideal, for at least one
reason would prefer to assume the legal duty to inform the offeree
of the legal status of the contract terms. 59 He wants the offeree to
be confident he can rely upon the implicit assertions of the offeror.
Then the offeree knows he need not go to the expense of checking.
The decrease in transaction costs will make the offeror's goods rela-
tively less costly as against known substitute goods. 60 The reputable
offeror newly in the business would reason similarly. Customer con-
fidence in the validity of the offeror's contract terms is an aspect of
goodwill that takes time and money to instill. The knowledge of the
potential customers of the legal duty not to mislead offerees would
abbreviate this process and more quickly bring additional business
to the new merchant. In this regard, the established, reputable
merchant Will dislike one result of the adoption of the legal duty not
58. For a discussion of these sociological consequences, see "Sociological Analysis"
at 869-85 of text.
59. Information generally is valuable to consumers. "Increases in the efficiency of
purchase decisions made are equivalent to increases in real income, and, given the
diversity of choices available in a modern economy, improved choices can lead to a large
gain." Beales, Craswell & Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. &
ECON. 491, 502 (1981). "At the same time, sellers have a substantial economic incentive
to disseminate information to consumers. Indeed, if information dissemination were
costless to sellers, theory suggests that disclosure would be complete." Id. For why the
theory may not work in practice, see id. at 503-13.
60. It might seem that the transaction costs of all goods would be reduced by a
comparable amount and thus there would be no competitive advantage to the offeror
from the duty of informing the offeree. Information costs cut across all markets. One
instance of this being not the case is where the offeree is already fully informed of the
substitute goods and therefore need not incur information costs for this competitive
purchase. The long-term renter who is considering buying his first house is illustrative.
He knows much landlord-tenant law but little of the law of real estate transactions. With
the buyer able to rely upon the seller's legal assertions, the relative cost of the house
purchase decreases.
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to mislead. His hard-earned goodwill will be less valuable since the
risk of being misled by other merchants will decrease. 61
There are administrative costs of relief from the problem consid-
ered. Now, generally, the offeree has no remedy in the usual case
other than to exercise his rights contrary to the unenforceable term,
if he learns of them in time. A more comprehensive remedy is here
being urged for consideration. That entails legal action with addi-
tional expenditures both private and public. Only the private costs
enter the calculus of prospective plaintiffs and resisting defendants.
The public will subsidize the suit by supplying the judicial machin-
ery. Inasmuch as there are more lawsuits under a regime that pro-
hibits the inclusion of knowingly unenforceable terms than under
one that does not, the public coffers are decreased. 62 This also
leads to an inefficient level of litigation. 63
The private costs of enforcing relief from this deceptive practice
enter the calculations of the parties as a transaction cost that raises
the cost of doing business. For any transaction the costs are higher
in proportion to the sharp business practices of the merchant but
some lie on all merchants of the particular goods however forthright
they are.64 The merchant will include the pro rata costs in the price
of the goods. Substitute goods, depending upon the nature of the
concomitant contract, have a differing "transaction tax" which af-
61. All these calculations are highly refined. That is why a merchant serving a
sophisticated clientele can charge more for his "reputability." The clientele will
perceive that the higher price tag does not necessarily mean a higher cost of goods.
They are aware of the hidden costs including those from misleadingly unenforceable
terms. The forthright merchant will only lose to the less reputable competition the
business of less sophisticated clientele. Whether the merchant dislikes this is a question
of personal preference and the goods he sells. Those who deal in luxury goods may not
object.
62. This assumes all lawsuits are similarly costly.
63. This inefficiency must be put against any efficiencies that are achieved by
imposing the duty to inform on the offeror. Some of these judicial costs are transitional:
"Once potential defendants learned that they would be more likely to be taken to court
and assessed higher damages if they did not perform their contractual obligations, they
would become substantially more willing to perform them. It seems reasonable to
expect that potential defendants would learn this lesson quickly." Slawson, supra note 4,
at 36.
The public has not been reluctant in the past to operate the judicial machinery to
maintain its notions of a fair marketplace. See J.W. HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY 66-90 (1982). Efficiency obviously is not the only grounds for this.
64. Even the merchant who fully satisfies the duty to inform will meet with nuisance
suits, the costs of which must be built into the price of the goods. If the merchant is in a
line of business with a particularly bad reputation for credibility, there will probably be
more nuisance suits, his own veracity notwithstanding.
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fects their competitive position. 65  Resources are, accordingly
reallocated.
Greater efficiency is not indisputably the overall allocative conse-
quence of a rule against known unenforceable terms.66 There are
factors pointing in both directions. The answer is empirical, not de-
ductive, and awaits field study .67
Distributive consequences have also been mentioned. There are
others. The well-informed consumer, without need of protection,
subsidizes the less well-informed. The risk preferrer subsidizes the
risk averter. The nonlitigious subsidizes the litigious. These dis-
tributive effects and others must be put into the balance. Reason-
able people will differ on whether these consequences are debits or
credits. As a spillover, the distributive effects also have sociological
impacts that must be considered.
C. Sociological Analysis
The effects of interfering with the status quo are difficult to pre-
dict. For alterations of no larger compass than those here being
considered, the conceivable reverberations through business and
65. The "transaction tax" may be defined as the cost to merchants of assuming, or
being assigned, the duty not to include unenforceable terms. The costs of producing
new form contracts and, to some extent, the litigation expenses of working out in the
courts the parameters of this new duty are transitional items in the tax. Some of this tax
will remain after the transition as part of the overhead. The amount depends not only
upon the merchant's reputability and that of his line of business but also upon the
nature of the goods he sells. For example, the use of public transportation is a
substitute for an automobile purchase. Unenforceable terms are not likely to appear in
this first option. Thus the ongoing transaction tax for public transportation will not be
as high nor will it increase upon the implementation of the new legal duty to inform,
unlike for the second option. Probably all the transaction taxes, nevertheless, are
ultimately lower than the costs to the offerees of obtaining accurate information.
66. Rawls seems to have little doubt: "[Miarket failures and imperfections are often
serious, and compensating adjustments must be made.... [Liack of information ... and
the like must be recognized and corrected." J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 272. Gordon
also raises the flag of freedom: "Most people would grant that fraudulent claims reduce
the welfare of consumers by making their allocation of income less efficient than it might
be. I would go further and argue that such practices constrict economic freedom by
reducing one's ability to act purposively." S. GORDON, supra note 18, at 167.
67. Even if perfect information supports the most efficient marketplace, it may have
disadvantages from a utilitarian viewpoint, notwithstanding the kinship between
utilitarianism and economics. For example, ignorance may be bliss: "somebody who is
universally regarded as ugly may prefer not to be told it." Hammond, Utilitarianism,
Uncertainty and Information, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra note 5, at 85, 102. For
our problem, the offeree for whom the unenforceable term proves irrelevant may prefer
not to know that the offeror was trying to take advantage of him. Which is not to say that
the offeree is not still "harmed" as a matter of principle: "even al undetected lie is
abusive of the trust of one's hearer." MacCormick, supra note 23, at 15 (disrespectful
and "a standing risk of actual harm").
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social relationships, and to persons individually, are extensive.
Ideal "social engineering" requires a synoptic or comprehensive vi-
sion of repercussions far beyond that realistically possible for all but
the simplest public choice. Potential consequences are not to be de-
rived deductively. Practice, or empirical fact, often stands in stark
contrast to the predictions of theory. Information is limited.68 A
broad approach may, nevertheless, narrow the uncertainty of pro-
jections. 69 Yet even with the most diligent attempt, today one is
sure to fall far short and thus, in the view of some, one must make
significant public choices cautiously and incrementally. 70
This section attempts to broaden the study of the prohibition of
unenforceable terms beyond the normative and ethical discussions
above.7' The label "sociological" is a catch-all meant to encompass
individual personality traits as well as broader societal characteris-
tics. 72 The topical divisions overlap. Some may be merely different
vantage points for a single consideration. The discussion, it must be
emphasized, is far from complete, far less even than the discussions
of ethics and economics, but is undertaken to highlight some of the
68. Personal experience offers the lesson that a particular influence on a person
appears to have the potential of resulting in opposite reactions. For example, a highly
affectionate parent may raise a child similarly affectionate or coldly distant. See J.Q
WILSON & R.J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 259 (1985). Action on humans,
when seen from afar, produces two possible polar reactions. Although a close
examination of the factors may allow for an accurate prediction of reactions, cf. id. at
238, public choice, in practice, is made at such a distance as to preclude refined
anticipations.
69. See G. MYRDAL, OBJECTIVITY IN SOCIAL RESEARCH 10-12 (1969).
70. In a leading work on social choice theory, Braybrooke and Lindblom conclude
that the synoptic approach to policy analysis must be abandoned in favor of trial-and-
error incrementalism. D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 18, at 37-57; see also
K. POPPER, THE POVERTY OF HISTORICISM 64-70 (3d ed. 1961) ("piecemeal social
engineering"). A major criticism of incrementalism is that some goals cannot be
achieved without giant steps, seeJ. ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS 9-18 (rev. ed. 1984).
For a general critique, see R. GOODIN, supra note 18, at 19-56. Solutions to our problem
of knowingly unenforceable terms do not involve, in Popper's and Elster's terms,
"Utopian engineering" of "global" magnitude. Mini-steps will do.
71. The economic analysis above may be properly fit in here instead. Marx, for one,
conflated economics and sociology. See J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 45 (3d ed. 1950); see also G. MYRDAL, supra note 69, at 10 (benefits of
synthesized methodology). Parsons, on the other hand, explicitly contrasted the
approaches. See B. BARRY, SOCIOLOGISTS, ECONOMISTS AND DEMOCRACY 75 (1970).
72. Raz refers to this impact as the indirect social functions of the law. They "are
those the fulfilment of which consists in attitudes, feelings, opinions and modes of
behaviour which are not obedience to laws or the application of laws, but which result
from the knowledge of the existence of the laws or from compliance with and application
of laws." Raz, On the Functions of Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 278, 289
(A.W.B. Simpson ed. 2d series 1973). See id. at 299.
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trailmarkers along the path to a fully synoptic vision of our
problem. 73
1. "Rugged Individualism"
Government intervention is accused of being destructive to public
and private goals when it is improperly paternalistic. 74 Such inter-
vention undermines the modern version of the rugged individualism
characteristic of the brave pioneers who settled this country and the
great entrepreneurs who industrialized it.7 5 Without this warp in the
fabric of the citizenry, the moral courage needed to face and con-
quer the tribulations of the day and epoch will be diminished. In-
deed, although one easily slips into righteous flag-waving in
expressing this idea, it is undeniable that society, collectively and
individually, gains from appropriate self-reliance and related traits.
Whether relief for unenforceable terms will frustrate this goal war-
rants scrutiny.
Hobbes instructs us that even the most rugged individuals barely
endure, bloody and enervated, in the depths of the jungle. 76 Fang
and claw are there supreme. This form of society, or lack thereof,
obviously is undesirable. The virtues of social order need not be
iterated. The cost of maintaining social order is some loss in this
degree of rugged individualism. Although the proper line between
individual liberty and government regulation is clearly unsettled, 77
73. Many of the points made are frightfully "soft," especially those regarding
surmised individual and societal psychological reactions. See MacCormick, supra note 16,
at 251-52. These traits, however, cannot be ignored if one takes seriously the "good
reasons" approach to moral questions. See supra note 22. As an example of this "soft"
technique, Feinberg, in arguing against nonintervention when a person sells himself into
slavery, stated:
But this would be to render the whole national character cold and hard.
It would encourage a general insensitivity and impose an unfair economic
penalty on those who possess the socially useful virtue of benevolence.
Realistically, we just can't let people wither and die right in front of our
eyes; and if we intervene to help, as we inevitably must, it will cost us a lot
of money.
Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in PATERNALISM, supra note 34, at 3, 13. For another, ex-
tended example, see Wasserstrom, Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions, in PHILOSOPH-
ICAL LAw 148 (R. Bronaugh ed. 1978).
74. Not all intervention is unduly paternalistic. Some areas of intervention are
necessary, as on behalf of the legally incompetent, and even beyond this obvious case, as
pointed out below, others would be agreed upon by rational persons.
75. Cf J. SCHUMPETER, supra note 71, at 132-33 (entrepreneurs analogized to
armored knights of Middle Ages).
-76. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 96-97 (1909) (1st ed. London 1651) ("the life of man
[is], solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short").
77. The most famous line is Mill's "harm" principle. See J.S. MILL, On Liberty,, in
UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, supra note 1I, at 81, 176-
200. As an example of the struggle to find a workable test, one might look to Hayek
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nearly no one doubts that physical threat and injury are appropriate
subjects of government control, even though paternalistic. 78 Still,
the existence of a police force will undermine rugged individual-
ism. 79 And this weakened physical and mental ruggedness is of real
concern, especially in time of war.80 There is not, nevertheless, an
outcry for a return of the law of the jungle. The tradeoff is not
worthwhile. What of the tradeoff for solving the problem in
question?8'
If relief from unenforceable terms were granted, eventually there
would be more confidence in the contractual assertions of others.
One could trust more one's business adversaries. The general level
of trustfulness would rise incrementally. 82 The general level of
trustworthiness would rise as well, for the offeror would be so con-
ditioned by a judicial stick. 83 These changes would also reinforce in
who, after criticizing Mill's test as not very useful, draws his line: "In determining where
the boundaries of the protected sphere ought to be drawn, the important question is
whether the actions of other people that we wish to see prevented would actually
interfere with the reasonable expectations of the protected person." F.A. HAYEK, supra
note 29, at 145. And what are "reasonable expectations"? Feinberg defines ten liberty-
limiting principles. SeeJ. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 26-27 (1984).
78. The anarchists are excepted. Some libertarians (if they are not anarchists) are
too. Nozick will go so far as to allow "a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of
protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on." R. NozIcK,
supra note 18, at ix. With Nozick's predisposition clear, whether he would include
knowingly unenforceable terms within "fraud" is to be doubted.
79. Poignant evidence of this comes from the public reaction to what appears to be a
breakdown of law and order. Self-defense training and weapons purchases may be
symptomatic of this social entropy.
80. From about the end of World War II through the early years of the Vietnam war,
nearly 40% of the draftees were found to be disqualified in the preinduction
examination, half of these for medical reasons. See Karpinos, Mental Test Failures, in THE
DRAFT 35, 42 (S. Tax ed. 1967).
81. What are the ultimate consequences of the rippling effects accompanying any
adjustment to the social fabric? Help is needed from the social scientists. See RAZ, supra
note 72, at 299. In the meantime, brace for "soft," speculative psychology. As stated
for a related issue, "(i]n practical cases the possibility of factual disagreement about
what causes produce what effects is likely to be overwhelmingly more important than
disagreement in ultimate ends between hedonistic and ideal utilitarians." Smart, supra
note 7, at 26.
82. "Reliance on promises, like reliance on anything else, is in good part a function
of usage and familiarity." Llewellyn, supra note 31, at 709.
83. "The law is a public statement of societal norms; and societal (and subgroup)
norms quite clearly influence the individual's preferences or values." Baker, Posner's
Privacy Mystery and the Failure of Economic Analysis of Law, 12 GA. L. REV. 475, 487 (1978).
See also id. at 488, 490-93 (effects of legal rules on preference formation); Morris, A
Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, in PATERNALISM supra note 34, at 139, 147 ("law plays an
indispensable role in our knowing what is good and evil for society").
Atiyah seems begrudging about these virtues:
At one time it was widely thought desireable that buyers should be
encouraged to stand on their own feet, examine the goods they bought
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everyone, other related character traits.84 Presumably this would
spill over into interactions beyond the commercial setting.8 5
The increased trust in the marketplace raises hazards for those
interactions in which there are no judicial sanctions to deter those
who take advantage of the spillover effects of generally improved
veracity. By being less suspicious, one might be lulled into assum-
ing risks where, for example, one can be taken in by the puffing and
avoidance tactics considered acceptable in negotiation.8 6 This
themselves, rely on their own judgment. This led naturally to the
doctrine of caveat emptor which was widely enforced in the Courts (though
never as widely as commonly believed) between about 1830 and 1870.
But today there is very little left of this doctrine because Courts (and the
public) no longer believe that there is anything wrong or unreasonable in
buyers relying upon the reputation and competence of manufacturers
and sellers rather than on themselves.
P.S. ATIYAH, supra note 38, at 172.
84. "Sincerity therefore, once introduced into the manners of mankind, would
necessarily bring every other virtue in its train." W. GODWIN, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
POLITICALJUSTICE 152 (K. Carter ed. 1971) (1st ed. n.p. 1793). Among the virtues may
be self-respect and respect for others. See Kupfer, supra note 23, at 115-16.
85. "[I]n a society whose public morality and political institutions could be
collectively or impartially adopted by all rational persons, there can be a quality of life
that cannot exist in a society without such morality or institutions. There can be relaxed
mutual trust, openness, absence of need for being on one's guard, friendly warmth
among persons, a cooperative spirit, the freedom with others that derives from
knowledge that one is not prospering at their expense." Brandt, The Concept of Rationality
in Ethical and Political Theory, in HUMAN NATURE IN POLITICS 265, 274-75 (J. Pennock &J.
Chapman eds. 1977).
To put it in the negative: "Here, the importance of practices would be stressed, and
the harm to persons quite outside the deceptive situation considered. Spread multiplies
the harm resulting from lies; abuse increases the damage for each and every instance."
S. BOK, supra note 23, at 104 (later quoting Augustine to similar effect); see also id. at 182,
195-97 (secondary effects of deceptive practices in social science research). More to the
point, in discussing the mutual deceits of bargainers in the marketplace, Bok says of
those who regularly participate:
They may then lose some ability to discriminate among kinds and degrees
of falsehood; and unless the lines between circumstances where the rules
allowing deception do and do not apply are very clear, the deceptive
tactics may spill over into other relationships. In the end, the participants
in deception they take to be mutually understood may end up with
coarsened judgment and diminished credibility, even though the original
bargaining practice seemed harmless in its own right.
Id. at 132.
Even when one is most inclined to decry markets as encouraging cut-
throat competitive individualism, one must remind oneself of the extended
range of mutual trust which a market both generates and requires. [J.
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 139-41 (1980)] reminds us of
the Aristotelian point that the relationships of mutual utility involved in
business dealings are a kind of friendship, albeit in a weak sense.
MacCormick, supra note 23, at 16 n.36 (emphasis in original).
86. See Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 113-16 (1982);
Luban, supra note 33, at 406-07.
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downside, however, is not a precipitous slope. People are accus-
tomed to compartmentalizing their attitudes of trust towards
others.8 7 Among family and friends the standards of veracity are
different from those in the marketplace. Even within the market-
place one differentiates regularly among products and merchants on
grounds of trustworthiness. "Brand names" and "goodwill" are not
meaningless notions. A departure from the most rugged individual-
ism does not necessitate spinelessness.8 8
One consequence of the proposed relief might actually lead to an
increase in some aspects of rugged individualism. Now, if one
learns that one has been deceived by reliance upon an unenforce-
able term, one is usually helpless. Permissible self-help is not likely
to be efficacious and legal remedies are few. Refusing to contract
further with the offeror is a hollow vindication against the rational
offeror who considered that possibility and determined it was a risk
worth assuming. The offeree is consigned to swallowing the harm,
dignitary or monetary. The painful reactions to this are not publicly
or privately desirable.89 But with a legal remedy available, one is
provided a weapon with which to assert and defend oneself.90 Char-
acter traits, akin to rugged individualism, would be reinforced in the
relatively benign formalized structure of the judicial arena where
"low blows" are prohibited (if not prevented). 9'
87. See G.J. WARNOCK, THE OBJECT OF MORALITY 80-86 (1971). But see supra note 85.
88. This assumption bottoms various legal principles. "[M]any legal protections are
due as much to those who will not look out for themselves as to those who do .. "
Vlastos, Human Worth, Merit, and Equality, in MORAL CONCETrs, supra note 22, at 141, 145
n. 1.
89. Unless, that is, they would generate enough steam to propel the offeree into
utilizing the governmental processes for institutionalized relief. Or the offeree may
decide to become as "rugged" as the offeror and "get" the next person as he was
gotten. The possibilities are myriad.
90. "This is the role of the tort law in providing the prospect of monetary redress for
the victim of an outrageous indignity in order to channel the instinct for retribution into
acceptable channels." Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869, 888
(1967). "Outrageous" may be too strong for our problem. Yet even for Sax and
Hiestand's problem, "[w]e do not characterize the slum landlord as a conscious or
willing evildoer; we agree that he is probably doing precisely what a rational profit-
seeking businessman in his circumstances would feel required to do." Id. at 892. He
"has no intent-in the sense of desire-to harm the plaintiff. His only interest is an
economic one, and the damage incurred by the plaintiff may be viewed by him not only
as undesired, but also as unfortunate and regrettable." Id. at 899.
91. Litigiousness is the danger here. It seems, unfortunately, that the extreme of all
virtues is a vice. Aristotle thought virtue, being a middle way, is subject to two extremes,
both of which are vices. See A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 144-45 (1981). This one can
be capped somewhat by actions such as wrongful civil proceedings and abuse of process.
But see infra discussion at notes 105-09.
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2. Educated Citizenry
A general presumption within the legal system is that each citizen
is fully aware of the law. 92 One effect in principle of this presump-
tion is to increase the level of knowledge of the law. By remaining
ignorant of the law, one may forego valuable rights; consequently,
one is induced to learn it. A citizenry well educated in the law is also
to be encouraged for the public goal of producing a more sophisti-
cated electorate. A negative consequence, then, of increasing the
justifiable reliance on another's assertions of law is a reduction of
the incentive to acquaint oneself with the law. 93
Beyond merely reducing an important inducement to learn the
law, the remedy considered here actually might encourage igno-
rance of it. For if relief is granted to one ignorant of the law but not
to one who is knowledgeable of the term's unenforceability, there is
an advantage to remaining ignorant, at least until the contract has
been signed. This undesirable inducement can be countered by
providing relief to offerees who already know at the time of con-
tracting that the term is unenforceable. 94 The informed offeree who
brings suit would then be acting purely as a private attorney-gen-
eral. This engenders compunctions paralleling the doctrines of
"clean hands" or in pai delicto.95 Should one be allowed to recover
92. See, e.g., E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 9.2 (1982) (discussing mistake); W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 759 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing
misrepresentations of law). "Legal fiction" may be a proper epithet for this
presumption. For more, see discussion of "Reasonable Citizenry" at 876-79 of text. "It
has, of course, been pointed out many times that there is never a 'presumption' that any
man knows the law. The proper statement is that, in many situations, ignorance of the
law is no excuse-a very different thing." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra, at 759 n.44.
93. But, as a counterpoint: "The case against fraudulent misrepresentation is easy to
make out .... [A]s a general matter, no social good can derive from the systematic
production of misinformation." Epstein, supra note 35, at 298 (footnote omitted). For
those familiar with Epstein's work, it will come as no surprise to learn that he does not
favor duties to disclose. Id. at 298-300.
Irrespective of the legal duty to exclude knowingly unenforceable terms, it is often
economically rational (read, "efficient") for the offeree to assume that the offeror's
assertions are correct, at least for the time being. See infra notes 99-100 for a discussion
of why this is reasonable. By prohibiting knowingly unenforceable terms, the implicit
assertions will indeed be correct more often. Insofar as the offeree relies upon the
proper assertions that would have been incorrect but for the legal duty not to mislead,
he will "know" the law more, not less, often.
94. If, as suggested in the discussion at 892-95 of text, punitive damages are
recoverable against the offeror, then the offeree will have the additional inducement of
this extraordinary recovery to learn whether terms are enforceable. Depending upon
how the question is resolved of whether to be actionable the offeree must be ignorant of
the nonenforceability at the time of contracting, the net effect of the judicial relief may
be a general increase in the public's knowledge of the law.
95. In Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1013 (1971), an attorney who was also an experienced investor was allowed to
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damages even though he has not been misled and, to the contrary,
may have deceived the offeror into believing that he has been mis-
led? Something can be said for adopting a good faith principle. All
preventatives seem to encourage dissembling by the knowing of-
feree, the offeror, 96 or both. This potential maneuvering further
complicates the good reasons for granting a remedy.
1
3. Reasonable Citizenry
The legal system treats parties as rational and thus responsible for
their actions. Some defenses, such as incapacity and duress, presup-
pose actions not reflecting this quality, but these are exceptions to
the legal standards based upon the Everyman known as the "reason-
able person." As was true regarding an educated citizenry, so also
the legal rules ought to put pressure on parties to conform to the
standard of reasonableness. 97 One might think that offering relief
recover under the securities laws against a broker for an illegal extension of credit from
the broker which both parties presumably knew to be illegal. For other similar cases in
the securities field, see generally Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472
U.S. 299 (1985) (in pari delicto defense not applicable in private damages action for
violation of federal securities laws where plaintiff-investors relied on false information
furnished by defendants-corporate insiders and broker dealer which defendants
represented to be accurate inside information); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) (doctrine of in pari delicto did not bar
recovery in private antitrust action where plaintiff-dealers were aware of illegal
arrangments formulated by defendant-parent corporation). See generally Crumplar, An
Alternative to Public and Victim Enforcement of the Federal Securities and Antitrust Laws: Citizen
Enforcement, 13 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 76, 83-87 (1975) (use of private compensatory action
as deterrent in anti-trust security actions whether or not plaintiff is at "fault").
Furthermore, if the informed offeree's recovery is based upon, say, a multiple of his
damages, perhaps under a statute or the rules of punitive damages, then he has the
perverse incentive to run up the extent of his injury. Id. at 89-91. Finally, it has been
debated whether in common circumstances the private enforcement of the law, relative
to optimal public enforcement, leads to overenforcement. Compare Landes & Posner,
The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975) (over) and Shavell, The Social
Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982)
(over) with Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers,
3J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974) (equal) and Menell, A Note on Private Versus Social Incentives to Sue
in a Costly Legal System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 41 (1983) (equal) and Polinsky, Private Versus
Public Enforcement of Fines, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980) (under).
96. Were the offeror liable only if he has actual knowledge of the unenforceability,
rather than merely reason to know of it, then he also has an incentive to remain ignorant
of the law. Or even, by means of self-deception or cognitive dissonance, the offeror may
be "unaware" of that which he has reason to know. SeeJ. ELSTER, supra note 70, at 178-
79.
97. "[R]ationality should be thought of as a human good and a social goal.... [An
implication of this idea is] that moral, social, and political theories should treat
rationality as a value to be promoted rather than as a property automatically attributed
to all normal persons." Gibson, Rationality, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 193, 193 (1977).
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from unenforceable terms will vent the pressure to conform to
proper legal standards.
A look at a typical case of a sale between merchant and consumer
reveals that it is often rational to accept the merchant's contract of-
fer without scrutinizing the terms for enforceability. First, the agent
of the merchant consummating the sale is probably not authorized
to agree to changes in the terms. Negotiation over a term will re-
quire the offeree to wend his way through the corporate bureau-
cracy to reach a person sufficiently high in the management
structure to have the authority. Second, when dealing with an au-
thorized agent, the offeree will often discover that either the author-
ized agent is not legally sophisticated regarding the enforceability
and therefore is not in a position to dicker over the term or, even if
he were, the contract is on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. It has been
well worked out by the company lawyers, and the managers have
neither the time nor inclination to revise it.98 Third, merely reading
the boilerplate and satisfying questions about its meaning will be
time consuming. The offeror will be far from eager to grant the
time to the offeree. Fourth, many terms address problems that
rarely arise. Because there is little risk to the offeree that such terms
will become operable, the discounted value of the negotiation is
quite low.
It is unnecessary to detail the scenarios involved in dickering over
the terms in the typical consumer contract. Do you, the reader, an
infinitely reasonable person, bother to read the (uninitialed) boiler-
plate? Of course not, because it is everyday knowledge that the
costs of such an endeavor outweigh the payoff.99 A reasonable per-
son assumes the risk of signing the unread, or at least not fully un-
98. One of the two basic guises under which abuses of power may be unconscionable
under UCC § 2-302 is "the refusal of the professional to bargain over a disclosed,
material term." Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 359, 359 (1970). See alsoJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-3 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing procedural
unconscionability); Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1174 (1983) (ubiquity of contracts of adhesion is consequence of economic forces;
treatment of them is issue regarding allocation of power and freedom between
commercial organizations and individuals); Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The
Transformation of Contract Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PIrr. L. REV. 21 (1984) (new
meaning of contract includes parties' reasonable expectations formed prior to signing
form contracts).
99. See Slawson, supra note 4, at 16-17.
Note the following observation concerning the 'ticket' cases by a
prominent Canadian judge, Justice Riddell, in Spencer v. Canadian Pac.
Ry., 13 D.L.R. 836, 843 (1913): 'We were told that everyone should be
held to have read his railway [baggage] check-that people generally did
read their checks. Speaking for myself, I never read a check in my life till
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derstood, contract in the belief that it will be easier (less costly) to
resolve difficulties once they arise. This is a rational economic deci-
sion that holds for all but the everyday or relatively large transac-
tions.' 00 In these circumstances for the law to impose upon the
offeree the duty to master the contract terms is to require the of-
feree to be unreasonable.101
Once a dispute relating to a contract term arises, the economic
calculation changes. The discounting for the improbability of a rel-
evant dispute is cancelled. It is now more worthwhile for the offeree
to determine the enforceability of the term. But it may still not be
worthwhile enough. Resisting the assertions of the offeror may re-
quire the retention of legal or other assistance. These transaction
costs, including the offeree's opportunity costs, may exceed the ex-
pected benefits rationally based upon the likelihood that the crucial
term is unenforceable. It may yet be reasonable for the offeree to
this one and never saw one read-nay, further, I have never heard of one
being read until the argument of this case.'
Mueller, supra note 3, at 249 n.4. Even if the term must be initialed or is otherwise
highlighted, with the usual faceless institution the attempt to have it fully explained or to
negotiate over it would be Kafkaesque.
[I]t is not worth it to invest time or money in the obviously futile enter-
prise of fighting over contract language. It is more rational simply to
ignore the terms and hope that you have happened on an honest seller
who is more interested in building a reputation for fair dealing than in
extracting the maximum possible gain from each individual transaction.
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference
to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 600 (1982).
100. This is because the offeree understands the offeror's reasoning, the general idea
being expressed by Adam Smith at a time before the modern marketplace separated
merchants from neighbors:
When a person makes perhaps 20 contracts in a day, he cannot gain so
much by endeavouring to impose on his neighbours, as the very
appearance of a cheat would make him lose. Where people seldom deal
with one another, we find that they are somewhat disposed to cheat,
because they can gain more by a smart trick than they can lose by the
injury which it does their character.
A. SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 538-39 (1978) (quoted in Stigler, Economics or
Ethics?, in 2 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 143, 172 (S. McMurrin ed.
1981)).
Though a rational economic decision, it may not be an entirely moral one when the
offeree, despite the ostensible contractual "promise," leaves open the possibility of later
challenging an "agreed upon" term. See P.S. ATIYAH, supra note 38, at 148-49. But see id.
at 169. Then again, the knowing offeror is not in a moral position to complain. Do two
wrongs make a right, or, may one fight fire with fire? Arguably so, in this case. See
Kupfer, supra note 23, at 110-11.
101. By having judicial relief from unenforceable terms, the reasonable risk assumed
by the offeree is lessened. As a result the transaction sufficiently large to warrant the
mastering of the boilerplate increases.
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capitulate without putting up resistance. 0 2 The law ought not to
demand more.
4. Growth of the Law
The common law is not static. Over the centuries it has under-
gone significant change. Progress, if indeed it is progress, has not
been linear. The primary means for this growth is the give and take
in the courtroom. One of the parties to a controversy, dissatisfied
with the state of the law, argues for the reconsideration of an old
doctrine or the consideration of a new one. The court agrees and a
step, forwards or backwards, is taken. Perhaps the legislature gets
into the act and implements a tentative judicial innovation or institu-
tionalizes its own. This legislation may be subject to constitutional
challenge. Or, the new legislative policy may encourage the court to
concretize it elsewhere by adopting related common law principles.
In this general manner, yesterday's unenforceable contract term is
today's enforceable one, and vice versa.
Any remedy aimed at deterring one party from including unen-
forceable terms as a means of exploiting another's ignorance must
not interfere unduly with this dynamic process of legal growth by
unfairly hindering those who fuel it. The unenforceable term may
be inserted in the legitimate belief that the rule is ripe for change.10 3
Or there may be reasonable doubt as to the legal status of the term.
The case for penalizing this offeror is weak.
In accommodating this legal process, the solution to our problem
becomes further complicated. The offeror, in defending his inclu-
sion of the unenforceable term, will be tempted to allege, truly or
falsely, that he was serving the larger good by laying the ground-
work for a reasonable challenge of the status or meaning of the
term. 0 4 His intention was not (just) to mislead the offeree. He is
not using the offeree as a means only to his ends. Is he to blame for
misperceiving the readiness for change or degree of legal
uncertainty?
The courts are familiar with the problem of discerning whether a
doubtful claim is made for legitimate or illegitimate purposes. A
102. The more ubiquitous the practice of knowingly including unenforceable terms,
the more worthwhile it is statistically for the offeree to challenge the offeror. The same
reasoning applies when the offeror or his line of business is known to be less reputable.
103. "Today's frivolity may be tomorrow's law." Risinger, HonestV in Pleading and Its
Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REv.
1, 57 (1976). "Suddenly what seemed unchallengeable is challenged .... R. DWORKIN,
supra note 22, at 89.
104. See infra note 108.
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similar factual question arises, for example, in the law of the wrong-
ful use of civil proceedings.10 5 In deciding the propriety of the pur-
pose of the proceedings by the defendant, "[t]he question is not
whether he is correct in believing that the court would sustain the
claim, but whether his opinion that there was a sound chance that
the claim might be sustained was a reasonable one."10 6 The defend-
ant's attorney may also be liable.' 0 7 Although this problem is not
new to the courts, it is doubtful that it has been resolved very well,
especially in the context of knowingly unenforceable terms where
the offeror can claim that the purpose for the inclusion of the term
was to challenge in the courts its legal status.' 0 8 The tort of the
wrongful use of civil proceedings and other potential remedies have
been criticized as being insufficient deterrents to improper suits. 0 9
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1965); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 92, § 120. The proceedings are wrongful when they "have been initiated or
continued primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of
the claim on which they are based." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 676 (1965).
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 675 comment f (1965). The purpose of
bringing a "nuisance suit" to provide leverage for a settlement is wrongful. Id. § 676
comment c. To be taken into account in deciding reasonableness is whether the
defendant obtained advice from counsel after full disclosure and whether the attorney
giving advice had an interest in the conclusion. Id. comment h.
107. The attorney may be liable for wrongful use of civil proceedings when he or she
brings or continues an action "without probable cause and for an improper purpose
other than the fee." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 comment d (1965). See also
Note, Attorney Liability for Malicious Prosecution and Legal Malpractice: Do They Overlap?, 8
PAC. L.J. 897, 904-06 (1977) (lack of probable cause for bringing suit as evidence of
malice in action for malicious prosecution). But the action is disfavored by the courts,
and recoveries against attorneys are rare. See Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees for Abuses of
the Judicial System, 61 N.C.L. REV. 613, 646 (1983); Note, Attorneys' Liability to Clients'
Adversaries for Instituting Frivolous Lawsuits: A Reassertion of Old Values, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
775, 781 (1979).
108. "One may believe that his claim is meritorious even though he knows that the
decisions in the state do not sustain it if he believes that the law is potentially subject to
modification and that this case may be a suitable vehicle for producing further
development or change." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 676 comment c (1965).
And how does the offeree demonstrate the lack or insincerity of this belief?.
109. For a critical survey of the remedies, see Note, Liability for Proceeding with
Unfounded Litigation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 743 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Unfounded
Litigation]. See also Note, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical
Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 1218 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Groundless Litigation] (history
of Anglo-American attempts to discourage malicious prosecution suits in civil actions)
In the context of the granting of punitive attorneys' fees,
[A]though courts apply an objective standard for the bad faith exception
to defendants' prelitigation conduct, they require much more to establish
bad faith on the part of a party (usually a plaintiff) for his assertion of a
substantive claim or defense. Although there is a mountain of authority
supporting the power of courts to impose attorneys' fees for substantive
bad faith, there is a veritable dearth of appellate cases in which fees have
actually been imposed on a party for his assertion of a groundless claim.
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An adequate balance between encouraging the forthright and dis-
couraging the dissemblers will not be struck easily.
One solution is to reduce or eliminate the liability of an offeror
who indicates to the offeree that the enforceability or meaning of
the term is questionable."10 The Uniform Commercial Code per-
mits a seller of goods to disclaim certain warranties by using flag
words such as "as is.,,"' A comparable disclaimer may be permit-
ted by a label such as "enforceability uncertain."" 12
Mallor, supra note 107, at 639 (footnotes omitted). "The operation of the subjective
standard has restricted the application of the bad faith exception for substantive bad
faith to 'nut cases.' " Id. at 642-43.
110. Another solution in principle is to grant relief once the offeree has proven the
offeror's malefides by a preponderance of the evidence but to discount the damages by
the plausibility of the offeror's defense. If, say, the factfinder is only 75% certain of the
offeror's blameworthiness, the award may be three-fourths of one in which there is
complete certainty. Under this proposal greater than 50% certainty is presumed to
equate with a preponderance of the evidence. Thus a mere preponderance of the
evidence would support a recovery of one-half of certainty. If the discounting were
more rapid, for example, zero recovery at the level of greater than 50% certainty, the
offeree's incentive to bring suit would often dissipate. However, these refined
calculations that discount the recovery for uncertainty may be overly-refined in practice.
111. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1978). Whether disclaimers work adequately has been doubted.
In discussing declarations of intent to perform an act with an explicit disclaimer of the
intention to be contractually bound, Atiyah states:
However, I do not accept, and the law today does not accept, the notion
that this sort of disclaimer is always conclusive. No doubt there are
circumstances in which such a disclaimer may be legitimate, but there are
also many circumstances in which it is not. The putative promisor may
well be attempting to have things both ways in speaking thus: on the one
hand, he wants to raise expectations in the minds of his hearers-what,
indeed, is the purpose of making statements of this kind if he does not
want them to raise expectations? And on the other hand, he wants to
reserve complete freedom of action. In some circumstances this sort of
disclaimer is thus a disreputable attempt to obtain the benefit of raising
expectations and inducing actions in reliance without accepting the
corresponding obligations.
P.S. ATIYAH, supra note 38, at 168 (footnote omitted).
112. If this solution is adopted, there are a few gambits by the offeror that must be
prevented. One is where he makes in the boilerplate a general disclaimer of
"enforceability uncertain" for all terms. The significance will be lost to the offeree
either from failure to see it or from conditioned callousness. The particular term must
include the flag words. Another gambit is where the offeror flags every individual term,
settled or not. The flags will pale into mere background noise. See Beales, Craswell &
Salop, supra note 59, at 530 ("When the exact language of a disclosure is specified, as it
often is, its effectiveness may decline over time because consumers learn to tune it out, a
phenomenon known as 'wear-out.' "). A countermove would be to grant a remedy for
unreasonably disclaiming enforceability on the grounds that the offeree is thereby
induced to seek legal counsel, i.e., incur costs, for no justifiable reason. To mark a term
with "enforceability uncertain" when the unenforceability is certain is itself like the very
problem in issue, the knowing inclusion of unenforceable terms.
In the Appendix is discussed the practice of including in securities brokerage
contracts with customers a partially unenforceable term that requires the arbitration of
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5. Governmental Power
Government intervention increases the power of the government.
This may threaten the liberty of the citizenry. 113 Power corrupts.114
Power attracts power.' 5 As an institution grows stronger, its agents
tend to seek self-aggrandizement through the enlargement of their
sphere of influence. Controlling key sources of information and the
resources for political impact, the institution is alive with potential
growth." 16 A second aspect of this power flows from the discretion
granted the institution. A mere glance at history will demonstrate
that discretion is abused. Even if not abused, the exercise of discre-
tion is subject to the fallibilities of the human agents."t 7 In the
words of Coke, it is better "to leave all causes to be measured by the
golden and straight mete-wand of the law, and not to the incertain
and crooked cord of discretion."' "18
all disputes. Some firms had attempted to avoid the misleading nature of the term by
adding a phrase such as "unless unenforceable due to state or federal law," or "to the
extent consistent with federal law." The SEC took the position that "such language
does not with sufficient clarity and specificity address the issue of recourse to the federal
courts for claims arising under the federal securities law and, accordingly, would not
satisfy" the proposed rule requiring firms to divulge to customers their right to litigate.
See Karmel, Securities Regulation, 190 N.Y.LJ. 1, 2 (Oct. 20, 1983) (with citations). This,
together with the other problems mentioned, sheds doubt on the efficacy of disclaimers.
113. Being ignored here is the hardly disputable proposition that the government, by
its protections through intervention, also enlarges the sphere of individual liberty. See,
e.g., T. HOBBES, supra note 76, at 128 ("And Covenants, without the Sword, are but
Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore .. .if there be no Power
erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on
his own strength and art, for caution against all other men.");J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at
239-43 (rule of law expands liberty by removing suspicion that others are not playing by
the rules). For dispute, see R. NozICK, supra note 18,
114. J. ACTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER 364 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1948). For
cites to similar ideas from Herodotus, Milton, Montesquieu, Kant, Burke, John Adams,
and Madison, with quotes, see F.A. HAYEK, supra note 29, at 449 n.4.
115. "[A] power vacuum is always filled by a power holder .. " A. BERLE, POWER 39
(1969).
116. See F.A. HAYEK, supra note 29, at 290-93. One
theory purports to explain bureaucratic behavior . . .on the basis of a
very small number of behavioral axioms, the most important of which is
that bureaucrats tend to act so as to maximize the 'budget' of their
bureau-where 'budget' includes not only salaries but also fringe
benefits, perquisites, and so forth.
A. BUCHANAN, supra note 38, at 21 (footnote omitted).
117. See, e.g., A. BUCHANAN, supra note 38, at 25-26 (despite fallibilities, human
discretion is integral part of functioning of governmental institutions).
118. E. COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 51
(1642) (quoted in F.A. HAYEK, supra note 29, at 168). For an interesting appeal for
official discretion, see Kearns, On De-Moralizing Due Process, in DUE PROCESS 229, 240 (J.
Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1977).
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Remedies here considered for unenforceable terms minimize
these concerns. The governmental institution involved is the court
system; common law rather than administrative law is the imple-
ment. Enforcement is left to the initiative of the offeree. The judi-
cial apparatus and enforcement mechanisms are called for, but these
institutions have been relatively free of corruption in recent times.
At least they do not seem to be any more corrupt than the private
individuals and institutions that would be regulated by the interven-
tion. 1 9 Nor is there reason for alarm about the self-aggrandizing
growth of these public institutions in carrying out this function.' 20
If anything, the judiciary seems to desire less power. 121
Worries have been expressed regarding the judicial system where
the courts exercise broad discretionary powers, as in constitutional
decision-making. 22  And "discretion" is needed here. Not in
choosing ends, nor means to ends, or, in modern terms, policies or
principles, but rather in discerning the facts and applying the law to
them. The factfinder, for example, must decide whether the con-
tract term was knowingly unenforceable and the decision will be in-
fluenced, no doubt, by improper factors which include the personal
characteristics of the parties. The question of punitive damages may
be raised, and that also will be subject to improper influences on
factfinding "discretion." The discretion at hand, nevertheless, is
limited by the "mete-wand of the law" and involves no more open-
endedness than is necessarily part of many other questions of fact
119. Is this damning with faint praise? On the other hand, depending upon the
relative interests, a slightly corrupt institution controlling a very corrupt one may lead to
an increase rather than a reduction in the overall corruption.
120. The complaints, other than in constitutional decision-making, have been leveled
at areas such as school integration and statutory civil rights where the courts are left with
(have assumed) much discretion as to proper means to given ends. Here the means as
well as ends are pretty much given.
121. The desire is ambiguous; it may be for less work, not less power. For more on
this contention, see generally C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 7 (4th ed.
1983); Burger, Annual Report on the State of the judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442 (1983); Four
Supreme Court Justices Speak Out, 70 A.B.A. J. 40 (Sept. 1984); Easterbrook, Legal
Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87 (1984); Feinberg,
Constraining "The Least Dangerous Branch ": The Tradition of Attacks on Judicial Power, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 252 (1984); Handberg & Hill,judicial Activism and Restraint on the United
States Supreme Court: A Political-Behavioral Analysis, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 173 (1984). The
same may not be said for the public institutions that enforce judicial rulings, such as the
marshall's office.
122. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) (discussing counter-
majoritarian tendencies of Supreme Court);J. ELY, supra note 18 (proposing third theory
of judicial review to accommodate assumptions of original intent theory and opposing
theory that judiciary has broad powers to define society's substantive values).
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and law.123 Still, these social costs are not to be written off
completely.
6. Uncertainty Costs
Irrespective of how narrowly circumscribed is the judicial discre-
tion, as noted above there still remain questions of fact and law that
are not quickly resolved. To the extent they are complicated and
otherwise uncertain, they will cause inaccuracies in predicting be-
forehand the courtroom outcome. This is costly.' 2 4 Nuisance suits
are facilitated. Defensive activities occur. Questions of fairness
aside, the consequence, according to one line of analysis, is that of-
ferors will be deterred from legitimate practices near the margin.
Generally, uncertainty creates inefficiency.' 2 5 Remedies for the
practice may then be disadvantageous from a utilitarian
perspective. 26
123. Hayek, certainly no welfare state interventionist, asserts that intervention is
particularly appropriate to prevent deceit. F.A. HAYEK, supra note 29, at 143-44. See
quote at note 29, supra. But Hayek may go too far in defending government
intervention. "A more extreme view still, attributable to Hayek, is that legal rules do not
restrict freedom, since freedom consists in the absence of arbitrary coercion. This is
gilding the capitalist lily." Miller, Constraints on Freedom, 94 ETHICs 66, 66 n.l (1983)
(emphasis in original) (citing Gray, Hayek on Liberty, Rights, and Justice, 92 ETHICS 73
(1981)). On the other hand, one must not go too far in the opposite direction:
The wisdom of man has never conceived of a government with power
sufficient to answer its legitimate ends, and at the same time incapable of
mischief. No political system can be made so perfect that its rulers will
always hold it to the true course. In the very best a great deal must be
trusted to the discretion of those who administer it.
Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. Stat. 147, 161-62 (1853) (quoted in Samuels,
The Economy as a System of Power and Its Legal Bases: The Legal Economics of Robert Lee Hale, 27
U. MIAMI L. REV. 261, 352 n.416 (1973)).
124. For the proposition that certainty is a most important feature of a legal system,
see F.A. HAYEK, supra note 29, at 208-09; cf. MacCormick, supra note 23, at 16 (need for
law to provide some guarantee of trustworthiness in commercial dealings).
Furthermore, "[m]any authors from Leibniz onwards have observed that the formal
requirements of unambiguous and constant laws are in many respects more important
than the need forjust laws, because if you can predict the decisions of the court you can
take precautionary measures that will protect you from unjust laws." J. ELSTER, supra
note 70, at 93 (footnote omitted).
125. For discussions of how uncertainty may create inefficiency, see R. POSNER,
ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 424-25 (2d. ed. 1977); Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 262-71 (1974); Ellis, Fairness and
Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 45-57 (1982); Posner, An
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 402-
06 (1973).
126. Kennedy and Michelman argue that it is an empirical question whether insecurity
and uncertainty undermine the incentives to produce goods. The mental experiments
forwarded by most economists are not sufficient proof. Kennedy & Michelman, Are
Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711, 759-62 (1980).
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Some of the uncertainty is transitional. Once the new doctrine is
refined by a series of cases, parties are able to narrow the range of
unpredictability. The offeror will know what practices are unaccept-
able and thereby be able to reduce the risk of nuisance suits and
expenditures for defensive tactics. Should the offeror still choose to
include unenforceable terms (without disclaimer), he will be in a po-
sition to predict better the potential judgments against him.
By way of summary of these ethical, economic and sociological
considerations, it seems that the case for relief from knowingly in-
cluded unenforceable terms is far from beyond debate. My own
perception (prejudice?) is, nevertheless, that the pros amply out-
weigh the cons. 127 If this is correct, it is natural to ask why the com-
mon law has failed to develop a general remedy. If you believe this
is not correct, I will ask anyway.
II. REMEDY
There is a peculiar twist to our problem that comes into sharp
focus when contemplating a remedy for the offeree. The paradigm
case is one in which the offeree obtains, as a consequence of the
misleading term, rights of greater value than he, from one view-
point, had reason to expect. A reading of the term would lead him
to believe that certain rights were contracted away when it turns out
that they were not. He received more than he bargained for. What
are the damages and, with or without them, what is the relief?. This
peculiarity calls for a close look at damages. A few of the more
promising common law forms of action, deceit and prima facie tort,
will then be examined.
A. Damages
1. Damages in Contract
The unenforceable term is part of a contract (or lease). The dis-
cussion must begin with contract damages. In going back to basics,
it is noted that the purpose of contract remedies is mainly to protect
three interests of the promisee: the expectation, reliance, and resti-
127. In discussing private choices, Nozick observes that "[t]he reasons do not come
with previously given precisely specified weights; the decision process is not one of
discovering such precise weights but of assigning them. The process not only weighs
reasons, it (also) weights them. At least, so it sometimes feels." R. NOZICK,
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 294 (1981) (footnote omitted). "I think that the whole
issue of objectivity [in legal or moral opinions] . . . is a kind of fake. We should stick to
our knitting. We should account to ourselves for our own convictions as best we can,
standing ready to abandon those that do not survive reflective inspection." R. DWORKIN,
On Interpretation and Objectivity, in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 30, at 167, 172.
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tution interests. 28 From this is seen the primarily utilitarian, rather
than deontological, orientation of contract law. Although nominal
damages are sometimes granted in the name of vindicating princi-
ple, 129 actual damages give rise more regularly to relief. Society is
reluctant to subsidize the costs of litigation for the assertion of prin-
ciple alone.
The expectation of the promisee is satisfied by giving him the
"benefit of the bargain." Here he received more than he bargained
for in the form of unexpected rights.' 30 There are no dashed
expectations. 13 1
The reliance of the promisee is protected when he changes his
position by, say, commitments in anticipation of performing the
contract. It is conceivable that for a particular unenforceable term
the promisee would incur expenses for his promised performance
not necessary in light of the unenforceability. But much more often
the term becomes relevant when the promisee fails to perform or
wishes to modify his performance.' 3 2 There usually is no relevant
reliance.
Nor, finally, is the promisee's restitution interest likely to be af-
fected. The typical term will not cause the promisor to be unjustly
enriched in the usual manner.133 There is, however, a subtle argu-
128. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1979) (three interests
protected by contract remedies); E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 92, §§ 2.1, 12.1 (general
purposes of contract remedies); Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages
(Parts 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936, 1937) (analysis of purposes pursued in
awarding contract damages).
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346 (1979); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 191-94 (1973).
130. An intriguing question is raised by the fact that the benefit-of-bargain damages
are negative, that is, the offeree receives more than he bargained for. Is it fair to allow
the offeror credit for the benefit unexpected by the offeree? Recall that the offeror, as a
rational economic person, would calculate the savings from inserting the unenforceable
term and perhaps pass along some of it to the offeree in order to make the contract
appear as a more attractive package. For further discussion, see supra note 57. One
viscerally balks at the idea that the offeror can institute a suit against the offeree in, say,
quasicontract, to recover the benefit conferred, There are theoretical problems with this
legal theory anyway. It is less clear whether the offeror ought to be able to use the
benefit conferred as an offset in a suit brought by the offeree. The principle of "clean
hands" and, perhaps, the policies of deterrence argue "no,"
131. Other than, that is, the expectation that there are no unenforceable terms. See S.
BOK, supra note 23, at 87 ("How much truthfulness were they expecting?"); see also id. at
130-32 (expected deception in certain bargaining situations).
132. Such as for an unenforceable cognovit provision or prohibition against assigning
(or subletting). The point of when the typical unenforceable term is operable is
impressionistic. A counterexample is where a landlord with a nonwaivable duty to repair
inserts a lease term transfering this duty to the tenant. Then the tenant's repair
expenditures are pursuant to his promised (but unenforceable) performance.
133. But see the counterexample in the note immediately above.
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ment for quasicontractual relief. The offeree, despite the appear-
ance that he was enriched by getting more than he had reason to
expect, actually enriched the offeror. This expectation of enrich-
ment was the inducement to the offeror for including the unenforce-
able term; it is the value of the offeree's foregone right as
anticipated and calculated at the time of contracting. 34 This may
be too attenuated to receive judicial recognition.' 35
Even if the interests protected by contract law did bear on the
particular unenforceable term under' the circumstances, they are not
in issue unless the offeror breaches the contract. The problem of
concern arises irrespective of the offeror's breaches. More often it
will be the offeree who breaches or anticipates breaching the con-
tract.' 36 Contract remedies are not the general answer.
One contract remedy not mentioned above may aid on occasion-
rescission.137 If, for example, the offeree would have sought or ob-
tained a release from the contract but for reliance upon the unen-
134. See supra text accompanying note 57.
135. Moreover, "[i]f the cheat can anticipate that the worst that can happen is that he
shall be called upon to pay back his profit upon the trade, he may be encouraged to
defraud." McCormick, Damages in Actions for Fraud and Deceit, 28 ILL. L. REV. 1050, 1055
(1933). McCormick then points out that punitive damages may furnish an adequate
deterrent. Id. For discussion of this extraordinary remedy, see "Extraordinary
Damages" at 892-95 of text.
136. There is an approach to the problem that may result in the offeror being found
in breach of contract for inserting a knowingly unenforceable term. The court may find
appurtenant to the inserted term, an implied term in the form of a warranty that the
implicit assertion of law is accurately stated. A misstatement of law would then be a
contractual breach of the warranty irrespective of the offeror's state of knowledge
regarding the enforceability. Indeed, in providing relief for the nondisclosure of
material facts, modern courts, to overcome precedential and remedial hurdles, are likely
to take the tack of finding an implied contract term rather than resorting to a tort duty of
disclosure. See P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 218-20 (3d ed.
1981). I pursue no further this tack of finding an implied term because it is my hunch
that courts will not resort to it here. Whereas the incipient duty of disclosure of material
facts is a recent judicial innovation that must overcome much precedent against the
recognition of affirmative duties, i.e., liability for nonfeasance, the (implicit)
misrepresentation of a knowingly unenforceable term is closely akin to the historical
action of deceit based upon the common implementation of a negative duty (not to
deceive), i.e., liability for misfeasance. Furthermore, in our context the tort remedies for
misrepresentation seem generally to be as flexible as the contract remedies for breach of
warranty. Thus the incentives for courts to innovate by finding an implied warranty are
less. Deceit and, perhaps, prima facie tort will do. See infra note 252. If, however, a
court does find a breach of an implied warranty, some of the damages discussed below in
the section on Damages in Tort may be applicable, for example, contract damages for
attorneys' fees and for mitigation.
137. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 359 comment c (1979)
(availability of equitable relief may be considered when choosing remedy best suited to
circumstances of case); D. DOBBS, supra note 129, at 254-56 (rescission as restitutionary
remedy).
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forceable term, rescission may be fitting relief along with, perhaps,
damages. 138 When the offeree who relies agrees to a disadvanta-
geous settlement, rescission of the settlement agreement as well as
the original one may be appropriate. Rescission alone is better than
nothing. 139
2. Damages in Tort
Tort damages may provide the answer that contract damages typi-
cally cannot.140 Their purpose is: "(a) to give compensation, indem-
nity or restitution for harms; (b) to determine rights; (c) to punish
wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct; and (d) to vindicate parties
and deter retaliation or violent and unlawful self-help."' 14 At least
three of these four are relevant. This holds partially because the
purpose appears to include deontological considerations independ-
ent of the particular consequential tradeoffs. 142 Thus the fact that
actual damages may be difficult to find may not be a hindrance to a
cause of action. The following examination of the tort doctrines re-
138. See D. DOBBS, supra note 129, §§ 12.1, 12.17. That punitive damages have been
attached to rescission, see J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 19.17 (1981). The issue of damages from foregone opportunities is
discussed infra at notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
139. Though there is rescission and there is rescission. The former one is of little use:
Once unconscionability has been shown, courts may refuse to enforce not
only the objectionable clause, but the entire agreement as well. The
prevalent response however, has been to refuse enforcement of only the
offensive clause; thus, the landlord loses nothing by the inclusion of an
objectionable clause. Consequently, this use of the doctrine affords little
preventative aid for an unwary tenant and limits relief to an after-the-fact
lawsuit applicable only to the parties before the court.
Note, Unconscionability: A New Helping Hand to Residential Tenants, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q 993,
1027 (footnotes omitted).
140. It will be noticed in this section on tort damages that most of the damages would
not exist but for the contract or lease term in question. That the right at stake is created
by a contract does not mean that interference with the right can give rise only to
contractual damages. Torts also can be based upon the invasion of or interference with
contractual rights and relationships. See D. DOBBS, supra note 129, § 6.4; W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON, supra note 92, §§ 92, 129.
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1965).
142. The punishment of wrongdoers and the vindication of parties may be justified in
deontological terms alone. See, e.g., I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE,
supra note 24, at xviii-xxii, 51-72, 99-108. The determination of rights may also be
justified on grounds independent of particular consequences, cf discussion supra at
notes 25-26. The same can be said regarding compensation for harms. See, e.g., R.A.
EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY (1980) (argument for compensation not based
on consequentialism). See generally Coleman, Aloral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits
(pts. 1 & 2), 1 LAW & PHIL. 371 (1982) (law of torts cannot be understood under any one
principle of morality), 2 LAW & PHIL. 5 (1983) (tort law as not rooted entirely in
principles of corrective justice).
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lated to our problem shows that this appearance turns out to be
somewhat misleading.
Compensatory damages are general or special. " 'General dam-
ages' are compensatory damages for a harm so frequently resulting
from the tort that is the basis of the action that the existence of the
damages is normally to be anticipated and hence need not be al-
leged in order to be proved. 'Special damages' are compensatory
damages for a harm other than one for which general damages are
given."' 43 It is not obvious whether the damages suffered by the
offeree are general or special. The reaction of the offeree often ex-
pected (hoped for) by the offeror is that upon a dispute the offeree
will read the unenforceable term and then quietly capitulate without
challenge, or if with challenge, that a beneficial settlement may fol-
low. That there is a harm "is normally to be anticipated" but I sus-
pect that the nature of the harm is so variable as not to fall within
the ordinary range of general damages. The harm is not as obvious
or usual as the general damages for, say, defamation or battery.
This issue, moreover, is a pleading and evidentiary problem that
need detain us no longer. I will treat the types of injuries in broad
terms without regard to whether they elicit general or special
damages.
Attorneys' fees are a form of damages that can often be expected.
The offeree who suspects he is foregoing or has foregone rights in
reliance upon an unenforceable term will, perhaps, seek legal ad-
vice. Or he might be dissatisfied with the direction of negotiations
over a dispute with the offeror and, without suspecting the improper
term, seek advice. This fee expenditure incurred before litigation
may be recoverable.' 44 Though the general rule is that attorneys'
fees are recoverable only if there is express statutory or contractual
authorization, 45 if the dispute has gone beyond the debate stage
and a legal proceeding has been instituted by the offeror, then the
costs of defending this action based upon an unenforceable term
may be recoverable. The offeror may have acted upon an improper
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 904 (1965).
144. The prelitigation conduct that traditionally has given rise to an award of
attorneys' fees is obstinacy in the face of a clearly valid claim. When the
defendant resists the plaintiff's clearly established right without
justification for doing so, his obstinancy gives the plaintiff no choice but
to seek judicial assistance in enforcing his right. In such cases, shifting
fees 'recognizes the unfairness of imposing the costs of litigation on the
party who should have freely enjoyed his rights.'
Mallor, supra note 107, at 632 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Comment, Court Awarded
Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 661 (1974)).
145. See D. DOBBS, supra note 129, at 194-200.
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cognovit provision, for example, or a purported contractual right to a
lien, in which cases the offeree can argue that the legal fees neces-
sary to respond to these acts are compensable as a punitive mea-
sure.146 If instead the scenario results in the institution of litigation
by the offeree, there is authority for the recovery of legal fees. 147
Compensation for legal fees is considered by some courts to be an
element of punitive damages, should they be appropriate. 48
Another possible basis for tort damages is the costs of opportuni-
ties foregone in reliance upon the term. An improper nonassign-
ment or nonsublet clause is illustrative.1 49 The offeree who
considers assigning or subletting may be deterred upon reading the
clause denying the right. Whatever advantage is lost to the offeree
by not pursuing the transfer is a harm to him.' 50 The opportunity
foregone may, on the other hand, arise from decreased bargaining
leverage with the offeror. The offeree, for example, in attempting to
resolve a dispute with the offeror, or to seek a release from his con-
146. "Deterrence of frivolous litigation, compensation of litigants who have been
wrongfully subjected to litigation, and punishment of abusive litigation practices can be
accomplished through the principled use of the punitive exceptions to the American
rule [which generally denies reimbursement of attorneys' fees]." Mallor, supra note 107,
at 619. Reimbursement may be particularly useful socially when the party is acting as a
private attorney general. See id. at 622; see also J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.78[3] (2d ed. 1985) ("in suits against private parties to
vindicate important public rights, the court could award attorney's fees against the
losing defendant, the plaintiff being viewed as a 'private attorney general' who should be
reimbursed for his expenses"); Zemans, Fee Shifting and the Implementation of Public Policy,
47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 190-91 (1984) (fee shifting as deterrent to frivolous
suits, punishment for actually bringing such suits, or method of increasing judicial
efficacy). For the view that the assessment of attorneys' fees to deter frivolous lawsuits is
a good idea, see the comments of the former ChiefJustice in Burger, The State ofJistice,
70 A.B.A.J. 62, 65 (April 1984).
147. See Mallor, supra note 107, at 632-35; Zemans, supra note 146, at 191 (for dilatory
actions).
148. See D. DOBBS, supra note 129, at 197; J. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, supra note 138,
§ 2.11; K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 3.5(B) (1980); see also "Extraordinary Damages"
at 892-95 of text.
149. Perhaps the clause gave the offeror an absolute right of refusal when the law
disallows refusals unreasonably withheld. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b
(McKinney 1986).
150. Proving the form of lost opportunity is often an insuperable problem for the
offeree. If the offeree merely contemplated an action contrary to the unenforceable
term, objective proof may not be forthcoming. In the words of one court: "We think,
therefore, that this case falls within the policy of our consistent refusal to allow damages
for fraud based on the loss of a contractual bargain, the extent, and, indeed, in this case,
the very existence of which is completely undeterminable and speculative." Dress Shirt
Sales Inc. v. Hotel Martinique Assocs., 12 N.Y.2d 339, 344, 190 N.E.2d 10, 12-13, 239
N.Y.S.2d 660, 664 (1963).
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tractual duties, may enter into a settlement contract at objectively
disadvantageous terms.' 5'
There is authority for the recovery of damages for injuries in the
form of opportunity costs that result from the loss of time or inter-
ference with the business, work, trade, or profession of the injured
party.' 52 Conceivably the offeree's mental distress is' compensa-
ble. 153 The loss of the use of property is also a cognizable harm. An
unenforceable self-help provision, for example, may trigger this. "If
one is entitled to a judgment for the detention of, or for preventing
the use of, land or chattels, the damages include compensation for
(a) the value of the use during the period of detention or prevention
or the value of the use of or the amount paid for a substitute, and
(b) harm to the subject matter or other harm of which the detention
is the legal cause."'' 54
The most common form of damages may result from a general
duty to mitigate damages. Once learning of the improper assertion
of rights by the offeror, the offeree with a cause of action will typi-
cally have the duty to mitigate damages. 155 The expenses incurred
are recoverable. ' 56 But the problem here for the offeree is to find
something to grab other than this boot-strapping loop. The duty to
mitigate arises if there is a cause of action, but because most rele-
vant causes of action require there to be actual damages, 57 the of-
feree must first find a compensable injury other than those
stemming from the duty to mitigate.
151. See discussion at notes 137-39, supra. The problem is evidence and the
speculative nature of this injury.
152. See, e.g., Conder v. Rowley, 109 Ind. App. 268, 272, 34 N.E.2d 162, 164 (1941)
(court noted that in negligence cases, "the rule is well settled" that where injury results
in loss of time or interference with business, work, trade or profession of injured party,
resulting damages may be recovered as special damages).
153. It is fair to include emotional distress as an element of damages in an
ordinary consumer contract claim, because the ordinary seller of
products or services to consumers knows that freedom from emotional
distress, including substantial inconvenience, is a major element in what
he is selling. It is an important part of the bargain-and-sale which he
makes with the consumer.
Slawson, supra note 4, at 38. Fairness notwithstanding, progress on this front has been
slow. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 92, § 12. Adjectives such as "outra-
geous," "severe" or "extreme" usually appear in successful actions. See id.; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 931 (1965).
155. In tort law this doctrine is known as the rule of "avoidable consequences." See
W. PROSSER & W.' KEETON, supra note 92, at 458-59. The doctrine of mitigation of
damages holds in contract law as well. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350
(1979).
156. See D. DOBBS, supra note 129, § 3.7.
157. See infra text accompanying notes 219, 231.
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This discussion of possible compensatory damages is not meant
to be exhaustive. Nor need it be exhaustive to show that no applica-
ble, broad theory of ordinary damages is apparent. The particular
circumstances ultimately control. Because of the unusual nature of
the problem, creative lawyering at uncovering damages will be espe-
cially useful. 158
3. Extraordinary Damages
None of the damage recoveries discussed above will cope ade-
quately with the general problem of unenforceable terms because,
even if there is a recognizable injury, its extent, in the absence of
unusual circumstances, is probably insufficient to warrant a suit by
the offeree in light of the high costs ofjudicial proceedings and typi-
cal inadequacy of damage recoveries. From the point of view of the
offeror, the practice is rather safe. The likelihood and the magni-
tude of the ordinary sanctions are often too slight to deter.1 59
Both of these intertwined consequences-the lack of incentive by
the offeree and the lack of deterrence of the offeror-would be over-
come if punitive, or exemplary, damages were commonly avail-
able.' 60 This remedy is the crux of a general solution.
The extraordinary nature of punitive damages is evident from
their doctrinal limitations. They do not provide an independent
ground for recovery but must attach to an underlying cause of ac-
tion. A contract action will not suffice; a tort action will.' 61 Nominal
158. The courts may be inclined to help: "The constant tendency of the courts is to
find some way in which damages can be awarded where a wrong has been done.
Difficulty of ascertainment is no longer confused with right of recovery for a proven
invasion of the plaintiff's rights." Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265-66
(1946). See also Samuels, supra note 123, at 283 n.86 (social effects change perception of
injury). But here again the offeree must avoid the bootstrap. If there is no right without
a (previously recognized?) compensable injury, there is no invasion that can be proved.
The court must unravel the problem carefully. This way may not do it: "The offeror
committed a wrong giving rise to (not, "because there is") a right in the offeree.
Whatever harm arose from this wrong is compensable." The circle is hard to avoid.
Loose reasoning, however, does not keep a court from arriving at its conclusion. For
legal rules, like ideas, "should be judged by their descendants, not by their ancestors."
J. ELSTER, supra note 70, at 4.
159. See Slawson, supra note 4, at 6; Note, Private Remedies Under the Consumer Fraud Acts:
The Judicial Approaches of Statutory Interpretation and Implication, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 413, 416-
17 (1972).
160. See Slawson, supra note 4, at 42. The assessment of punitive damages aimed at
deterrence must be at a level high enough to make it clear to the rational defendant that
the occasional recovery will offset any gains from the illicit practice for which actions are
not brought.
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 908 comment c (1965); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 92, at 9-11.
But see D. DOBBS, supra note 129, § 3.9, at 207. See generally J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER,
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damages, it is said by some, will not support them. 62 Their pur-
pose is primarily to punish, an aspect of which is to deter socially
unacceptable acts. 163 "Punitive damages may be awarded for con-
duct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his
reckless indifference to the rights of others." 164
Some doctrinal restrictions on punitive damages stem from the
fear of judges that passion will distort the jury's judgment. 65 Evi-
dence of this is the rule, arguably indefensible in principle, that ex-
traordinary damages must bear a fixed or reasonable relationship to
actual damages. 166
supra note 138, §§ 5.16-.19 (discusses when, generally, punitive damages are available in
tort and contract actions); K. REDDEN, supra note 148, §§ 4.2-.3 (same).
162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment f (1965); D. DOBBS, supra
note 129, § 3.9, at 208-10. Although this assertion is often made by primary authorities,
only two jurisdictions have been found to have firm holdings in support. See D. DOBBS,
supra, § 3.9, at 209;J. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, supra note 138, at § 5.37.
McCormick believed that nominal damages ought to be sufficient, the requirement of
actual damages being perhaps a blurring of the doctrine that there must be an
underlying cause of action with the fact that most causes of action themselves require
pecuniary damage or bodily harm. See McCormick, Some Phases of the Doctrine of Exemplary
Damages, 8 N.C.L. REV. 129,149-50 (1929).
163. Atiyah even suggests that, "[i]n effect, the avoidance of liability on a fraudulently
induced contract is [in itself] a penal process." P.S. ATIYAH, supra note 38, at 24.
Exemplary damages are more likely to serve their desired purpose of
deterring similar conduct in a fraud case . . . than in any other area of
tort. . . . An occasional award of compensatory damages . . .would
require the offender to do no more than return the money which he had
taken from the plaintiff. In the calculation of his expected profits, the
wrongdoer is likely to allow for a certain amount of money which will
have to be returned to those victims who object too vigorously, and he
will be perfectly content to bear the additional cost of litigation as the
price for continuing his illicit business. It stands to reason that the
chances of deterring him are materially increased by subjecting him to
the payment of punitive damages.
Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 406, 179 N.E.2d 497, 499, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492
(1961).
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1965); see also C. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 79, at 280-82 (1935) ("defendant's conduct must
have been willful or wanton"); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 92, at 9-10
(discussing punitive damages).
165. See D. DOBBS, supra note 129, at 211; K. REDDEN, supra note 148, § 3.6.
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment f (1965);J. GHIARDI &J.
KIRCHER, supra note 138, §§ 5.39; K. REDDEN, supra note 148, § 3.6C. There seems to be
in principle no reason to relate directly punitive damages to the measure of actual
damages. The purposes of the two forms of damages are different; they are measured
from varying perspectives. Actual damages are plaintiff-regarding. They are to
compensate the plaintiff for injuries he has suffered. Punitive damages, insofar as they
are for deterrence, are defendant-regarding. They are to be set at a level which would
admonish a rational person at the time of his contemplated act that it will not pay.
There is no necessarily direct, one-to-one correlation between these two perspectives.
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The knowing inclusion of unenforceable terms seems to demon-
strate the offeror's "reckless indifference to the rights of others."1 67
There is no evil motive or malice in the sense of a desire by the
offeror spitefully to injure the offeree without the thought of reap-
ing personal gain; instead, the offeror disregards rights to make a
profit.' 68 This is enough. 169
One controversial facet of punitive damages is whether they may
properly be granted for vicarious liability.' 70 The American Law In-
stitute takes the position that a defendant is not insulated from lia-
bility simply because the conduct was that of an agent.' 7' This
principle bears on our problem. For one, the offeror may be a cor-
poration that acts only through agents. For two, the form agree-
167. The question remains whether the offeree has a general right to be free of
unenforceable terms knowingly inserted. This is discussed in the next section.
Owen, while discussing the nature of civilly punishable misconduct, stated:
As in much of tort law, the proscribed behavior that will support a
punitive award involves at bottom an abuse of power, particularly one
which is extreme .... The abuse of power in many cases ... involves the
abuse of information vital to the plaintiff-the deliberate misstatement of
information, the failure to convey the information to the plaintiff, the
defendant's failure to act properly upon it, or in some cases the
defendant's failure to acquire it. Whether the cases are considered in
terms of information costs, cost avoidance, fairness, or efficiency, the law
does have some appropriate role to play-quite possibly more than
simply assigning compensatory damages responsibility, yet sometimes
less than imposing criminal responsibility ....
Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 103, 104-05 (1982).
168. See supra note 90.
169. See D. DOBBS, supra note 129, at 204-08;J. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, supra note 138,
§ 19.19; K. REDDEN, supra note 148, §§ 3.1-.2. That disinterested malice may be
required for the action of prima facie tort, see infra note 248.
170. For glimpses of the controversy, see, e.g., DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE
CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 12-13 (1969);J. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, supra note 138,
§§ 5.05-.14; K. REDDEN, supra note 148, § 2.4(B); Ellis, supra note 125, at 63-71.
171. In their words:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other
principal because of an act by an agent if, but only if,
(a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the
manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was
reckless in employing or retaining him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in
the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or
approved the act.
This section is duplicated in two restatements: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909
(1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1958). It appears that this test (the
"complicity rule") for vicarious liability is recognized by, depending upon who counts, a
slight majority ofjurisdictions,J. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, supra note 138, § 5.06, or half of
them, ELLIS, supra note 125, at 63. The other half grant vicarious liability more expan-
sively whenever the agent's act is in the course of employment. Id.
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ment may be prepared by an attorney serving as an agent of the
offeror whether or not the offeror is a corporation. 72 The form
agreement may also be prepared by an attorney acting on behalf of a
trade association or retail publisher of legal documents. 73 The
trade association or publisher are not usually agents of the offeror
who uses the form; instead, they are independent contractors. The
publisher, trade association or their attorneys may be directly liable
to the offeree for an underlying cause of action, but the independent
status precludes vicarious liability of the offeror unless he satisfies
the requisites for punitive damages by ratification or approval of the
term. If a cause of action does lie against these independent con-
tractors, they, as any other tortfeasors, are subject to liability for
punitive damages.
To summarize, there are several stumbling blocks to the use of
punitive damages as a deterrent of unenforceable terms. Perhaps
the most formidable one is that there must be an underlying cause
of action. This element can be put off no longer.
B. Causes of Action
Throughout the discussion thus far, the action of the offeror has
been characterized by terms such as "misleading" and "decep-
tive." 174 Immediately raised by this labeling is the prospect of relief
by the common law action of deceit. Indeed it is available on occa-
sion. In other, probably most, instances, the consequences of the
term do not wholly satisfy the elements of deceit. This section will
point to the trouble spots, a main one being the nature of the injury
or harm.
The second most apparent common law cause of action is prima
facie tort. It also is considered at length. A few other potential the-
ories of recovery are mentioned briefly. All of the mentioned reme-
dies for our problem fit roughly. Some of the rough edges are being
rubbed off byjudicial developments. Increasingly, if not extensively,
172. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 comment e (1958). I ignore the next
level of complexity: the attorney may be an agent of an incorporated law firm.
173. In New York, for example, standard legal (Blumberg) forms are ubiquitous.
174. Two commentators find there to be eight basic ways in which a person may
deceive another. See Chisholm & Feehan, The Intent to Deceive, 74 J. PHIL. 143, 143-45
(1977). Our problem may verge upon "lying": "What distinguishes lying as such from
the other types of intended deception is the fact that, in telling the lie, the liar 'gives an
indication that he is expressing his own opinion.' And he does this in a special way-by
getting his victim to place his faith in him." Id. at 149; see Linehan, Ignorance, Self-
Deception and MoralAccountability, 16J. VALUE INQUIRY 101, 103 (1982). Lying is "thought
to be worse, other things being equal, than other types of intended deception." Chisholm
& Feehan, supra, at 153 (emphasis in original).
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relief may become available. The peculiarities of each case are de-
terminative. There is little indication, however, that any of the
traditional forms of action are verging on modifications sufficient to
meet the general problem.
1. Deceit
The traditional definition of the action of deceit is: a fraudulent or
deceptive misrepresentation of fact made with an intent to deceive
or mislead another, with that other acting in reliance upon the mis-
representation to his detriment. 175 Courts and scholars, particularly
those of the American Law Institute, have progressed beyond this
timeworn concept of deceit that first emerged as an independent
tort in the late eighteenth century.' 76 The direction of this progres-
sion leads towards a solution of our problem.' 77
The elements of the action of deceit as characterized by the sepa-
rate titles of the Restatement (Second) of Torts are: fraudulent char-
acter of misrepresentation; expectation of influencing conduct;
justifiable reliance; causation; and damages for fraudulent
misrepresentation. 178
a. Fraudulent Character of Misrepresentation
The inclusion of a term in a contract is a representation. Although
it is not a direct, explicit statement as to the belief or knowledge of
the offeror in the enforceability of the provision, it "amounts to an
assertion not in accordance with the truth."1 79 At least it implies the
175. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 92, § 105. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 525 (1965) expresses the general rule:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion,
intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain
from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit
for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation.
176. "[D]eceit at first had the peculiar narrow signification of cozening a court in
some way and was really one of the forms of abusing legal procedure. It developed
through the law of sale in particular and the law of contract in general, but did not
appear as an independent tort until 1789 in Pasley v. Freeman," 100 Eng. Rep. 450
(1789). Winfield, The Foundation of Liability in Tort, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1927)
(footnotes omitted). The penal aspect of liability of deceit, noted by P.S. ATIYAn, supra
note 38, at 24, is supported by Blackstone: "[A]ny deceitful practice, in cozening
another by artful means, whether in matters of trade or otherwise ... is punishable with
fine, imprisonment, and pillory." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, Commentaries * 158 (footnote
omitted).
177. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 comment 1 (1965).
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 22 (1965).
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 comment b (1965). Even if the term is
held not to be a representation, the law of deceit may require the offeror to disclose the
unenforceability of the term.
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offeror's "judgment as to the legal consequences that would be at-
tached to the particular state of facts if the question were
litigated." 180
The representation typically is, ex hypothesis, fraudulent. The of-
feror knows the term is unenforceable and desires to take advantage
of the offeree's ignorance."8' The offeror, on the other hand, may
be uncertain or have no basis for knowing of the term's legal status.
Under the modern tests, this lack of certainty will not preclude lia-
bility.182 The economic arguments support this.1 83 The evidentiary
hurdles do too. Otherwise the offeror can place before the offeree
the oftentimes insuperable burden of proving the offeror's actual
knowledge.
The offeror who is an attorney, or who is represented by an attor-
ney, cannot normally argue that he was ignorant of the law. The
offeror is liable if the attorney is an employee under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, or, if not an employee, the offeror ratifies or ap-
proves the term.' 84 Should the attorney fail to inform his client of
the unenforceability of the term, in a suit against the offeror the at-
torney may ultimately be liable.' 8 5 The offeree may be able to sue
the attorney directly for deceit or other torts whether he is an
One of the oldest and most prevalent methods of regulating consumer
transactions has been to require the seller to disclose to his consumer
buyer various types of information about their contractual
transaction. . . .The common law of misrepresentation and public law
concerning deceptive advertising, although usually concerned with
preventing the dissemination of misleading information, at times have
been interpreted to require the disclosure of contractual information.
Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions, 1973 Wis. L. REV.
400, 400-01 (footnotes omitted). Under federal regulations, "the law of deception has
now developed to the point of virtually eliminating any line between advertisements
which are deceptive and advertisements which simply fail to inform." Beales, Craswell &
Salop, supra note 59, at 495. For various definitions of deceptive advertisements, see id.
at 496-501.
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 comment d (1965).
181. In an early attack on the doctrine of caveat emptor newly recognized by the United
States Supreme Court, Verplanck claimed "it should be fraudulent to withhold 'any fact
... necessarily and materially affecting the common estimate which fixes the present
market value of the thing sold.' " Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract
Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917, 948 (1974) (quoting G. VERPLANCK, AN ESSAY ON THE
DOCTRINE OF CONTRACTS: BEING AN INQUIRY How CONTRACTS ARE AFFECTED IN LAW AND
MORALS 125-26 (1825)). His view was shouted down.
182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1965).
183. It will be recalled that the strongest point is that the usual offeror can gain this
information on enforceability relatively more cheaply than the offeree and spread the
costs of obtaining it among many transactions. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
184. See infra note 191.
185. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1958). But "an attorney is not
necessarily subject to liability for an error of law .. .which, in view of the state of the
science, it is not unreasonable for him to make." Id. comment c.
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agent,' 8 6 or an independent contractor. 187 The attorney's liability,
direct or indirect, is not unfairly burdensome. Already he or she is
held to high standards in advising clients of the law; 188 the legal
"advice" to the client's adversary requires no additional knowledge
by the attorney. It is simply a matter of expressing that knowledge
nonfraudulently. 189
186. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 343, 344, 348, 350, 360 (1958)
(discussing liability of agent for torts such as fraud and negligence).
187. Notice, for example, that the general rule for deceit of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1965) makes no reference to the need for the misrepresenter
to be a party to the victim's act in reliance. See supra note 175. Similarly, the general rule
for prima facie tort of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1965) is open with
respect to the relationship of the plaintiff and defendant. See infra note 226.
188. But, in England at least, not to the highest standards. Atiyah observes that
misrepresentations are often enforced strictly, irrespective of the fault of the
misrepresenter. In other circumstances, particularly involving professional services
such as legal advice, negligence is required. Commenting on the distinctions, "not
always easy to understand," Atiyah surmises that "[t]hey are probably due in part to a
reluctance to impose liability on professional men in the absence of fault because of the
great importance of reputation to the professions. But there is perhaps also the feeling
that a professional client is more likely to appreciate that he is buying advice which may
be right or may be wrong." P.S. ATIYAH, supra note 136, at 189. Does the client's offeree
have the same appreciation?
189. The duty of care of the attorney to a client's adversary is well established.
Although the primary responsibility is to the client and only secondarily to the
adversary, still the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10 (1979) states:
"The duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal does not militate against his
concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal
process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm." More specifically,
In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: . . . (2) Knowingly
advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except
that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law. . . . (5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact. . . . (7)
Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal
or fraudulent.
Id. DR 7-102. "A lawyer shall not: . . . (4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." Id. DR 1-102.
Perhaps this demands too much of the attorney.
A lawyer can scarcely fail to be a dishonest man. This is less a subject for
censure, than for regret. Men are, in an eminent degree, the creatures of
the circumstances under which they are placed. He that is habitually
goaded by the incentives of vice, will not fail to be vicious. He that is
perpetually conversant in quibbles, false colours and sophistry, cannot
equally cultivate the generous emotions of the soul, and the nice discern-
ment of rectitude.
W. GODWIN, supra note 84, at 275. For a Roman view of the lawyer's privileged tactics,
see Golding, On the Adversary System and Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL LAW, supra note 73, at
98, 120 n. 13 ("crafty, deceptive and sophistical").
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A similar analysis applies to the trade association and publisher of
legal forms.' 90 Both doubtlessly have obtained legal advice from an
attorney and have every reason to believe that inaccuracies will be
relied upon by the offeree and even an unknowledgeable offeror.
As for the publisher, presumably offerors purchase the forms more
commonly than offerees, and thus the publisher is motivated to in-
crease marketability by "stacking the deck" in favor of the offeror.
For the trade association, the motivation to slant the form is obvi-
ous. The publisher or trade association, being independent con-
tractors, would not subject an ignorant offeror to liability under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, 191 but either, or their attorneys, might
be liable directly to the relying offeree. t 92 The lack of privity of con-
tract is not preclusionary.193
A comprehensive understanding of the law is not easily obtained.
Many areas are unsettled, or become unsettled. To impose liability
on a party who makes assertions of law that are reasonably defensi-
ble at the time, but later become indefensible, would miss the mark
aimed at here. It is the overreaching offeror who takes advantage of
another's ignorance of the law who is to be deterred, not the busi-
nessperson who desires reasonable doubt to be resolved in his
favor. 194
Once a rule becomes settled, or clearly changed, the duty arises
not to mislead the offeree. Later contract or lease extensions, or
renewals, would then need revision to reflect the legal development.
When a dispute arises under a term enforceable when agreed upon
but since declared unenforceable, the knowing offeror should not
be entitled to make false assertions, explicit or implicit, about the
term's continued validity. Allowance is appropriate for a reasonable
period to disseminate information on a new precedent or statute. 95
But when a statute has been enacted which will not become effective
190. The example in the Appendix of the securities customer agreement with a
partially unenforceable arbitration clause was included in a form produced by a trade
association, the Securities Industry Association.
191. For more information on respondeat superior and vicarious liability of independent
contractors, see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1 comment e, 2, 14N,
219, 220, 257 (1958); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 92, §§ 69, 71. As for
vicarious liability for punitive damages, see the discussion at note 170, slipra. When
there is some doubt whether the offeror is aware of the unenforceability, a fair solution
may be to grant rescission but not damages, or actual damages but not punitive
damages.
192. See supra discussion following note 173.
193. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (1965).
194. Reasonable doubt may call for a disclaimer to put the offeree on notice. See supra
discussion at note 110.
195. See infra the discussion in the Appendix.
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until a later date, no generosity need be extended to the knowing
offeror who includes before the effective date a contrary term in an
ongoing contract. Nor need generosity be extended to the trade
association or publisher that leaves outdated forms in circulation
beyond a reasonable time.
b. Expectation of Influencing Conduct
This element poses no problem. The very purpose of the offeror
in including the unenforceable term is by supposition to influence
the offeree to forego his rights. Otherwise the inclusion of the term
is a waste of ink. Most contract terms are inserted to influence
conduct.
c. Justifiable Reliance
For the offeree to obtain damage relief in tort, rather than merely
rescission in contract, he must demonstrate that the misrepresenta-
tion was material. 196 Since the misrepresentation typically relates to
significant legal rights, there is little doubt as to its materiality. Two
other stumbling blocks within the element of justifiable reliance
must be addressed. First, the representation being one of law rather
than fact, the offeree must cope with the precedent that limits ac-
tions of deceit to misrepresentations of fact. Second, he must show
that his reliance upon the offeror, or the offeror's attorney, trade
association or publisher, was justifiable despite the circumstance
that they are considered adverse parties. 197
There is no "liability for an opinion on a question of law, or for a
misrepresentation or misunderstanding as to law, as to which both
parties are presumed to have equal knowledge."' 98 This summa-
rizes the historical limitation of the action of deceit to misrepresen-
tations of fact, not law. The standard reason is that "statements of
law ... are commonly said to be mere assertions of opinion, which
196. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1965), to RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(2) (1979) ("A misrepresentation is material if it would be
likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent, or if the maker knows that it
would be likely to induce the recipient to do so.").
197. Perhaps I have passed too quickly over the requirement that the plaintiff
demonstrate that indeed he did rely upon the misrepresentation. Owing to the twist in
our situation of the contract's unexpected value to the offeree, this element ties in
closely to the element of damages, discussed at 885-95 of text. The subjective aspect of
the offeree's reliance, as with all questions of mental states, is difficult to demonstrate.
The courts are slowly, perhaps too slowly, lowering this and other hurdles for
consumers. See Hester, Deceptive Sales Practices and Form Contracts-Does the Consumer Have
a Private Remedy?, 1968 DUKE L.J. 831, 862-63, 874; Note, Consumer Protection in Florida:
Inadequate Legislative Treatment of Consumer Frauds, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 528, 534-35 (1971).
198. JOYCE, DAMAGES § 2215, at 2280 (1904) (footnotes omitted).
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are insufficient as a basis for deceit, estoppel, or equitable relief."1 99
More specifically and quite contradictorily, first, every person is pre-
sumed to know the law already, 200 and second, since special training
is required to learn the law, the assertion of law must reasonably be
assumed to be merely opinion. 20 Additional warrant for this may be
found in the public policies favoring an educated and reasonable
citizenry and, perhaps, rugged individualism. 20 2
The rule and its reasons immediately suggest exceptions for the
situation here being treated. First, the presumption of equal knowl-
edge of the law is problematic when one party, the offeror, is in a
business for which the misrepresented law is important enough to
be included in standard contracts while the other party may enter
into few related transactions. 20 3
Second, the reason that assertions Of law are ordinarily regarded
as expressions of opinion would not apply here. The businessper-
son-offeror who produces a written contract, often a printed form
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, is not regarded by a reasonable offeree
as merely opining about the enforceability of the terms. One natu-
rally assumes that the offeror has substantial reason to be fully
aware of the relevant law and, though the offeror himself may not be
trained in the law, he would go to the trouble to find out from one
who is if there is any significant doubt. One cannot survive in a
business by guessing about the controlling law. At the very least the
offeror is misrepresenting his state of mind. The term is spelled out
without qualification and it is probably interpreted by the offeree as
believed by the offeror to be enforceable without qualification. 20 4
That misrepresentations of law are not actionable is a proposition
not today in favor.20 5 Courts generally allow relief for mixed ques-
199. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 92, at 758.
200. See supra note 92.
201. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 92, at 759.
202. After noting the contradiction above, Prosser and Keeton opine: "The general
rule seems to have arisen rather out of a deliberate policy requiring the parties to a
bargain to deal at arm's length with respect to the law, and not to rely upon one
another." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 92, at 759.
203. This point is questionable when the offeror is involved in a mom and pop
operation. The presumption of superior knowledge is then weaker. Perhaps in this
circumstance the offeree ought to demonstrate that the offeror had knowledge, or
actually had reason to know, of the unenforceability. See Note, Residential Leases, supra
note 1, at 534 n.73. Disparate knowledge is also doubtful when the offeree is in the
same business as the offeror or is in a related business.
204. Even if this is not the case, something can be said for legally presuming the
offeree's faith in the offeror's inferred belief. A contrary assumption implies a
distrusting, cynical view of the marketplace that ought not to be reinforced by legal
doctrine. See supra the discussion at notes 82-85.
205. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 92, at 759.
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tions of law and fact. 206 The analysis of representations as mixed
ones of law and fact often smacks of legal fiction. 20 7 The proposi-
tion seems ripe for legal fiction or other judicial tricks, because the
contradictory rationales for it are a signal that something is amiss.
One may well wonder if this isn't a step towards complete abolition
of the distinction between assertions of law and fact. 208
The American Law Institute has already taken its final step in
abolishing the distinction. "One who fraudulently makes a misrep-
resentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of in-
ducing another to act or refrain from action in reliance upon it, is
subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to
him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation." 20 9
In proving justifiable reliance, the offeree must get over the sec-
ond hurdle which exists because the assertion has come from ant ad-
versary party or that party's agent. Rugged individualism favors this
doctrine.
The recipient is not justified in accepting the opinion of a
known adversary on the law and is expected to draw his own
conclusions or to seek his own independent legal advice. On
the other hand, if the maker of the representation purports to
have special knowledge of the law that the recipient does not
have, reliance upon the opinion may be justified.210
If the offeror is known to be an attorney, special knowledge is, of
course, implicitly purported. And if the unenforceable term is
known or reasonably presumed to be inserted by the offeror's attor-
ney, the offeree again may assume special knowledge and profes-
sional honesty.21' Similarly, if the term appears in a form contract
or lease prepared by a trade association or publisher, a reasonable
206. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 92, at 759-60 (with citations).
207. For brief discussion of some exemplary cases, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 92, at 759-60.
208. "Since it is obvious that representations of law almost never are made in such a
vacuum that supporting facts are to be 'implied,' it would seem that very little can be left
of the 'general rule' in the face of a series of such decisions." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 92, at 760. The British developments have been similar. See P.S. ATIVAH,
supra note 136, at 224.
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1965). Even in the first Restatement
the American Law Institute took this position. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 525 (1938).
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545 comment d (1965). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 170 comment b (1979) (reliance on opinion
may be justified if maker of misrepresentation purports to have legal expertise). For a
related issue, compare the discussion supra at notes 33 and 86 which discuss the effect of
the "puffing and avoidance" tactics acceptable in negotiations.
211. Id.; see supra note 189.
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assumption is that the form was prepared with professional, legal
guidance. 2' 2
When the offeror is not an attorney, or has not received legal ad-
vice either directly or indirectly, little guidance can be found in the
comments to the Restatement regarding the circumstances under
which the misrepresenter is treated as purporting to have special
knowledge or superior information about the law. At the one ex-
treme an ordinary layperson is justified in relying upon a legal opin-
ion from a real estate or insurance agent on simple questions. 21 3 At
the other, one real estate agent may not justifiably rely upon an-
other agent's legal opinion. 2 14 The gap is enormous and unnar-
rowed by the Restatement. The courts must be guided by their own
lights.
d. Causation
For the misrepresentation to be actionable, the offeree must rely
upon it when entering into the transaction. 21 5 This element se-
verely hinders the usefulness of the action of deceit for many fact
patterns. Oftentimes, perhaps most times, the unenforceable term
appears in a form contract as boilerplate and receives no particular
attention at the time of contracting. The offeror will make no oral
statement regarding the subject of the term and the offeree will sign
the document without reading it beyond a summary glance to check
the handwritten parts and, maybe, any prominently displayed
printed clauses. The offeree will not attend to the provision until
sometime after the contract has been signed. A conflict arises be-
tween the parties, or the offeree considers an action pursuant to the
contract (for example, assignment of a leasehold), and then the
form will be perused for pertinent terms. At this point reliance oc-
curs, foreseeably so. 2 1 6 Apparently, it is too late.2 17
212. A more difficult question in this context is whether the offeror who relies upon
such store-bought forms ought to be liable along with the publisher. If the offeror
knows or has reason to know that the form includes an unenforceable term the answer
would seem to be yes-even liable for punitive damages. See discussions supra at notes
173, 191.
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545 comment d (1965).
214. Id.
215. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF rORTS § 546 comment a (1965). Without reliance
the offeree's expectations at the time of entering the contract will not be disappointed,
thereby undermining the justification for relief: "fraud may be considered as unfair
because it leads to the disappointment of legitimate expectations." S. GORDON, supra
note 18, at 91. But Atiyah stresses the distinction between protecting reliance and
expectations. See P.S. ATIYAH, supra note 38, at 42-44, 163-64.
216. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A (1965).
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Sometimes it will not be too late. When the offeree, relying upon
the misrepresentation, disadvantageously settles a dispute with the
offeror, there is the necessary causation. The misrepresentation in
the first contract foreseeably carries over to the second. For exam-
pie, if a tenant, when paying off the landlord to be released from a
lease, relies upon the validity of an unenforceable clause such as a
nonassignment provisioi, the misrepresented term causes the of-
feree to be damaged when entering into the settlement contract.
Another example is where the contract or lease is void or voidable
because of the inclusion of the unenforceable term. Performance
pursuant to the abortive contract or lease after reliance upon the
term may be considered part of a new contract or lease, the mutual
assent being manifested by the actions of the parties. The offeree's
actions then satisfy the causation element. Generally, whenever the
offeree enters into a second contract with the offeror in reliance
upon the unenforceable term in the first contract, causation may be
fulfilled.
The second contract entered into in reliance upon the unenforce-
able term in the first contract may be with a third person rather than
with the original offeror. Instead of settling with the landlord, the
tenant might, for example, in the face of an unenforceable provision
that the landlord will not paint the apartment, contract with a third
person to have the unit painted. The reliance causes damages. 21 8
217. There is an ambiguity in the black letter test of the Restatement which can be
read as avoiding this reliance problem and permitting broad recovery in the
paradigmatic cases. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 546 (1965), Causation in Fact,
states: "The maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability for pecuniary
loss suffered by one who justifiably relies upon the truth of the matter misrepresented, if
his reliance is a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct that results in his
loss." The course of conduct here is refraining from exercising rights legally not to be
denied by contract. The offeree relies upon the assertion of law in the contract in
deciding this course of action. Yet all this arises after the contract has been signed, a
point not specifically alluded to in the statement above although it is raised in one of the
comments and the illustrations. See id. comment a and illustrations 1, 2 & 3 for
illustrations of the reliance requirement.
218. The contract with the third person resulting from reliance on the unenforceable
term in the prior, offending contract may be identical to a contract that would be
entered into with that third person even in the absence of the reliance. Assume the term
is an invalid disclaimer of liability for property damage. The offeree, after being
damaged by the offeror, enters into a contract of repair with the third person. Assume
also that the standard procedure for making a claim against one in the position of the
offeror is to repair the goods elsewhere and then submit the bill to the offeror. Then the
situation is one in which, at the time of disputing the term with the offeror, the offeree's
prior contract in reliance is indistinguishable from one not in reliance. It would be
difficult for the offeree to prove that the contract with the third person was in justifiable
reliance.
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e. Damages
The last element of deceit, damages, owing to the peculiarities of
the stock case, will often be difficult to find. 21 9 It has been discussed
above. 220 That damages are required at all for the action to lie
shows, the express purpose of tort damages notwithstanding, 22 1 that
deontological considerations are not controlling. Principle alone is
not enough. 222
2. Prima Facie Tort
Much of the law of torts evolved from the ancient common law
form of action of trespass on the case. 223 Modern tort forms reflect
this history in their elements. In the earliest centuries trespass on
the case seems to have been an open-ended writ that allowed the
courts to supply a remedy for whatever appeared to be a wrong not
otherwise actionable. 224 With the passage of time, case rigidified
along with the other forms of action. Today it is debated whether
there is any flexibility left in the body of tort law.2 25
219. The damage oddities of our case aside for a moment, half a century ago
McCormick pointed out the importance of deterrence to the remedies for deceit. He
noted the trend in deceit actions away from granting only out-of-pocket losses in favor
of loss-of-bargain losses and attributed the more liberal recovery to the purpose of
deterring intentional acts by deceivers. McCormick, supra note 135, at 1055.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 140-58.
221. See supra discussion at note 142.
222. The Scots, in their public law at least, may be more principled: "the Scots
common law crime of simple fraud ... does not require success. It is sufficient that the
accused has acted deceitfully with the intent either to make some gain from, or to cause
some detriment to, the victim." MacCormick, supra note 23, at 15. Recall that despite
the lack of success, the victim is still "harmed." See supra note 67.
223. For the history of this form of action, see generally C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND
SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAw: TORT AND CONTRACT ch. 4 (1949); Brown, The Rise and
Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Principle, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 563 (1959); Dix, The
Origins of the Action of Trespass on the Case, 46 YALE L.J. 1142 (1937); Plucknett, Case and the
Statute of Westminster II, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 778 (1931); Winfield, supra note 176, at 5-6.
224. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *122-23; 4 id. at *442; F.W. MAITLAND,
FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAw 66-67 (1936); Dix, supra note 223, at 1142; Winfield,
supra note 176, at 2, 5-6.
225. Some courts and commentators insist that the field of torts is closed. See, e.g.,
Ward, The Tort Cause of Action, 42 CORNELL L.Q 28, 28 (1956) (quoting Landon, editor of
F. POLLOCK, TORTS 45 (15th ed. 1951)). Others disagree. See, e.g., Brown, supra note
223, at 573 (prima facie tort principle still useful); Halpern, Intentional Torts and the
Restatement: A Petition for Rehearing, 7 BUFFALO L. REV. 7, 12 (1957) (prima facie tort
doctrine gives policy-making functions to courts); Winfield, supra note 176, at 5
(elasticity of action on the case). "[T]he law of Torts is based on the principle that one
who harms another has a duty of compensation whenever it is just that he should pay;
. . . that although justice may be colored with expediency, it always involves current
ideas of economics and morality .... " W. SEAVEY, COGITATIONS ON TORTS 3 (1954).
The cohesiveness of torts is also questioned. At one extreme it is believed that torts
can be unified under the general elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages. See,
1988] 905
906 CINCINNATI L4 W REVIEW [Vol. 56
The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts fall within the
group of commentators who believe that the range of tortious inju-
ries is not foreclosed. The Restatement's general principle for in-
tentional torts is: "One who intentionally causes injury to another is
subject to liability to the other for that injury, if his conduct is gener-
ally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances. This lia-
bility may be imposed although the actor's conduct does not come
within a traditional category of tort liability." 226
The drafters point out that this principle has been called the in-
nominate form of the action of trespass on the case of prima facie
tort. 22 7 That it might be very similar to an established tort does not
preclude application, even if the result is to avoid a restrictive rule
of a traditional tort.2 28
The essence of this intentional tort, as with all torts, is a balancing
of conflicting interests. The terms "injury," "culpable," and "justi-
fiable" in the general principle above reflect the need for this bal-
ance. 229 More specifically, four factors must be evaluated: "(1) the
e.g., Ward, supra at 44 (common denominators of all torts). Under this unifying
description there may be room as the need arises for new torts, or harms newly
recognizable as actionable under old labels. While others have found some unity in
torts, though not quite this much, see, e.g., F. HARPER, TORTS V-Vi (1933); F. POLLOCK,
supra, ch. 1; still others have contended that individual torts developed independently
over the centuries and are now loosely connected and encompassed by the title "torts"
for heuristic reasons, see, e.g., SALMOND ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 3 (16th ed. R.F.V.
Heuston ed. 1973). See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 92, § 1; WINFIELD
ANDJOLOWICZ ON TORT 13-15 (12th ed. W.V.H. Rogers ed. 1984).
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1965). Note the affinity of this standard
to the general requirement for the recovery of punitive damages, supra note 164. Also
note the affinity to the "good reasons" approach to ethics, supra note 22. Is prima facie
tort a broad judicial instrument to keep conduct from falling too far below moral
minimums? See Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 504 (1952).
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment a (1965); see Friedmann,
Modern Trends in the Law of Torts, 1 MOD. L. REV. 39 (1937); Halpern, supra note 225, at
13. The first enunciation of the doctrine of prima facie tort is attributed to Lord Bowen
in Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 QB.D. 598, 613 (1889), aff'd, [1892]
A.C. 25, and the first American adoption was by Justice Holmes in Aikens v. Wisconsin,
195 U.S. 194 (1904), although he signaled his approval a decade earlier in Holmes,
Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894).
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment j (1965). But see, e.g., National
Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Whelan, 492 F. Supp. 374, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("a primafacie
tort may not rest upon conduct that is well within the area of activity meant to be
regulated by a traditional tort, and which is insufficient to establish that tort"). The legal
process facilitates evolution largely by adopting such arcane techniques as legal fiction
and specious reasoning as a means of bypassing stare decisis. This often creates
transitional inconsistencies and implausible distortions. Much can be said for unpacking
these covert means by the open directness of prima facie tort. Historic baggage can
more easily be discarded. Yet the balancing process built into the doctrine is a proper
retardant to the overly eager court.
229. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment e (1965).
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nature and seriousness of the harm to the injured party, (2) the na-
ture and significance of the interests promoted by the actor's con-
duct, (3) the character of the means used by the actor and (4) the
actor's motive." 230 These factors will be examined individually in
the light of our problem.
a. The Nature and Seriousness of the Harm to the Injured Party231
Physical harm to the offeree or his property, the harms protected
most extensively by the common law, are not likely to occur. One
can imagine cases where they would, as where the offeree and his
property are injured as a consequence of the offeror exercising his
claim under an unenforceable self-help provision. To rectify these
wrongs, however, the offeree will probably avail himself of better
established remedies; for this example come to mind the common
law actions of trespass d.b.a. or trespass q.c.f and the statutory action
of forcible entry and wrongful detainer. Types of harm other than
physical are more probable.
"Harm to existing advantageous relations weigh less heavily than
physical harm, and harm to prospective pecuniary interests, less
heavily still."232 Though these are not the weightiest harms accord-
ing to the Restatement, they and related ones are the ones most
often, perhaps usually, protected by courts in those jurisdictions
that have recognized prima facie tort.23 3 One might speculate that
the reason for this is that the more undeniable, immediate harms are
already adequately protected by other tort actions. The economic
harms may not be as direct as the physical harms to person and
property but they are real ones that are fully measurable in dollars
and cents.
Emotional harms are less easily monetized. Nevertheless, they
deserve protection under the Restatement if they are more severe
than merely the hurt feelings that often ensue from the interactions
230. Id.
231. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment f (1965)
(discussing nature and seriousness of harm to injured party).
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment f (1965).
233. See, e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350
(1921) (lawful act done with purpose of forcing another to join defendant or cease to do
business); American Guild of Musical Artists v. Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, 36 N.E.2d 123
(1941) (plaintiffs forced to join labor union or not be permitted to fulfill their
professional engagements). For additional citations, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 870 Reporter's Note (1965). See also Note, Prima Facie Tort Recognized in Missouri,
47 Mo. L. REv. 553, 553 n.5 (1982) (citations to U.S. prima facie tort cases).
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of daily life.2 3 4 Severity, in fact, is an important aspect of all the
protected interests, for a severe harm to a less significant interest
may warrant relief more than a slight harm to a more significant
interest. 235
One of the interests treated by the Restatement as of little signifi-
cance, that is, not worthy of much independent protection, is digni-
tary harm. 236 This depreciation reveals a utilitarian orientation by
the drafters. 237 A strict Kantian would dissent. 238 Dignitary harm
might cause a party sufficient emotional harm to deserve protection,
according to the Restatement, but by itself falls outside the ambit of
prima facie tort.239 Support for this comes from the historical inter-
pretation of the damage element of trespass on the case. It requires
pecuniary injury. 240
The interest often most directly affected by the inclusion of an
unenforceable term is, arguably, the interest in one's dignity. The
offeror is encroaching upon the offeree's autonomy, his freedom of
234. For citations of the articles in the first half of this century that paved the way for
the modern recognition of liability for mental distress, see W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON,
supra note 92, at 55 n.l. See generally id. § 12 (discussing infliction of mental distress).
235. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment f (1965).
236. See Halpern, supra note 225; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment f
(1965). A dignitary harm is one "based upon the protection of interest in
'personality.' " D. DOBBS, supra note 129, at 528. An interesting case in which relief was
denied for a harm that seems essentially dignitary is Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aft'd, 275 A.D. 692, 87
N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949), in which music in the public domain composed by a Soviet was
used in the soundtrack of an anti-Soviet film.
It is noteworthy that the English historically had a different view of the need to grant
relief for dignitary harms. A strong impetus behind the recognition of punitive
damages, also known as "smart damages" for the smart to the plaintiff, was to protect
against insult. SeeJ. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, supra note 138, § § 1.02-.03; K. REDDEN, Supra
note 148, § 2.2(C). Some commentators believe that American courts hold the same
position of protecting against insult with punitive damages. See Symposium Discussion, 56
S. CAL. L. REV. 155, 155-56, 158 (1982) (Ellis & Wheeler). It seems strange that punitive
damages may be given for insult, but ordinary damages, under prima facie tort, may not.
Especially since the malice requirement for the two are nearly identical.
237. Perhaps it reveals a fear of the untoward growth of suits for nominal damages,
not a current favorite of the law. See Brown, supra note 223, at 573. After discussion
Brown concludes: "the prima facie tort principle need be neither feared nor thwarted on
account of the fear of suits for nominal damages." Id. Perhaps there is a general fear of
unpredictable consequences. Id. at 571. Evidentiary problems are also in the wings.
238. See supra discussion at notes 27-30.
239. Dobbs characterizes "dignitary interest" expansively to include interests
protected by many well-established torts, including assault, battery, false imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of mental distress. See D. DOBBS, supra
note 129, § 7.3. As suggested below, the Restatement seems to have a more restrictive
view of it.
240. See Brown, supra note 223, at 573; Halpern, supra note 225, at 13.
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will, his existence, as an independent ethical being.2 4' Yet the law
traditionally has all but closed its eyes to this type of incursion and
the influential drafters of the Restatement did not help to open
them. In the absence of an adventuresome court, we must look for
protection to the other interests that are also invaded by the inclu-
sion of unenforceable terms. 242
b. The Nature and Significance of the Interests Promoted
by the Actor's Conduct 243
The parties are involved in a business transaction. The offeree
has contracted with the offeror who may have been assisted by an
attorney, a trade association, or a publisher of the contract form.
These latter parties know on which side their bread is buttered. It is
in their business interests to make the contract appealing to the of-
feror. All the interests, then, seem to be commercial. 244
Commercial interests are certainly generally deserving of compre-
hensive legal protection. But not all aspects of them are deserving.
Deterring the offeror and those who assist him from this particular
activity will not place them at a competitive disadvantage. There is
no competition, by legal definition, for unenforceable contract
terms. On the contrary, the offeror's acts hinder legitimate compe-
tition for enforceable terms by misleading those in the marketplace
as to the true qualities of the goods they seek. Nor is there a recog-
nized interest, commercial or otherwise, in being able to take advan-
tage of another's ignorance, actively induced. The marketplace may
be far from ideal, but the gap is to be narrowed by legal doctrine,
not widened.
241. See supra note 29.
242. Some cases may be read as establishing the precedent. For example, in Tully v.
Pate, 372 F. Supp. 1064 (D.S.C. 1973) (applying Georgia law), a prima facie tort claim
was upheld where the defendant-mother interfered with the father's burial rights
regarding his deceased children.
243. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment g (1965)
(discussing interests promoted by actor's conduct).
244. The assertions of law that are misrepresentations are a form of speech, but
hardly the type of speech that has received protection under the first amendment. See,
e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980) ("The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the
public than to inform it."); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)
("there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact").
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c. The Character of the Means Used by the Actor 245
"If the means is illegal or unfair or immoral according to the com-
mon understanding of society this constitutes a factor favoring lia-
bility." 246 Let him step forward who would defend the morality of
this practice of deliberately misleading another. Or even the prac-
tice of asserting untruths convenient though not studied owing to
self-serving ignorance. Society may choose to countenance the
practice, but if so, not because it commonly understands it to be
inherently acceptable behavior, but rather because the negative
spillover of plausible remedies is perceived to be of greater mo-
ment. Defenders must sidle through a side door.
d. The Actor's Motive247
A disinterested malevolence or pure desire to harm the offeree is
clearly to be discouraged. Some courts hold it essential for prima
facie tort; when the malevolence is combined with any other motive,
no action in prima facie tort will lie.248 Others will grant this remedy
245. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment h (1965)
(discussing character of means used by actor).
246. Id.
247. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment i (1965)
(discussing actor's motive).
248. There is much authority in New York, the state historically with the most prima
facie tort cases, which states that disinterested malevolence is a requisite. See, e.g.,
Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney, 308 N.Y. 164, 169, 124 N.E.2d 104, 106 (1954) (complaint
dismissed where plaintiffs failed to prove defendants' refusal to permit members to work
for plaintiff union was purely malicious and done with no legal or social justification);
Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 90, 140 N.E. 203, 206 (1923) (no cause of action
stated where defendants' motives were not purely malicious, but included self-
protection and desire to establish legitimate business). A momentary pointing towards
general liberalization of prima facie tort was Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom
Teachers Ass'n, Local 1889, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 343 N.E.2d 278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975)
(complaint stated cause of action where defendant utilized legal procedure to harass
plaintiff and intentionally to inflict economic harm by compelling 87 teachers to attend
hearing on same day thereby forcing plaintiff to hire 77 substitutes), but upon second
thought, "New York's courts have consistently limited the [prima facie] tort to such an
extent that most of the reported cases were dismissals for failure to state a cause of
action." Leitner, Torts, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 433, 462 (1980). See also Forkosch, An
Analysis of the 'Prima Facie Tort' Cause of Action, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 465, 475-79 (1957) (New
York requisites for prima facie tort).
This requisite stems from the view that when the ends are legitimate, e.g., profits, the
means need not be justified. The dissenting courts subscribe to the view that proper
ends do not themselves justify the means. See Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination and
Non-Feasance, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 196, 196-97 (1946).
Surely this motivation of disinterested malevolence is antisocial and not sufficiently
deterred by the usual remedies. Punitive damages would help. These extraordinary
damages are most widely granted to combat malice. See supra note 164. Be that as it may
and notwithstanding judicial statements to the contrary, the earlier New York authority
has been read as recognizing prima facie tort even when the motive is not purely to
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even when the entire motive of the actor is to increase his profits. 249
Our problem falls within this latter category.
Once the court evaluates these four factors and finds the offeree's
interest worthy of protection, more must be done. The first step
gives rise to the offeror's duty; still must be found breach, causation,
and damages. 250 Breach and causation will be fairly easy to demon-
strate. The question of damages must confront the twist to our
problem extensively dealt with above. 251 On the bottom line, if the
morality of the marketplace is to be raised, in our context as well as
many others, prima facie tort is probably the most powerful, expedi-
tious vehicle of the common law-if the courts will unbrake it.252
3. Other Common Law Theories
The presence of an unenforceable term may harm the offeree in
ways other than those discussed above. Even without further specu-
lation to support this proposition, the general scope of the problem
is manifest by now. Deceit and prima facie tort are the common law
causes of action which first come to mind, but without unduly exer-
cising the imagination other doctrines can be seen to be relevant
under differing scenarios. Among them are wrongful civil proceed-
injure the plaintiff but also, or even exclusively, economic. See Note, Abstaining from
Willful Injury--The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 10 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 57-59 (1958); see also
Note, supra note 226, at 505-07 (nature of defendant's motive requisite to relief under
prima facie tort); Note, supra note 233, at 557-58 (motive required of defendant under
N.Y. court's interpretation of 'intent to injure' is uncertain).
249. The Restatement falls within this camp. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 870 comment i (1965).
250. See supra note 225.
251. See supra text accompanying notes beginning at 128. The finding of damages for
prima facie tort may be less troublesome than for the action of deceit. Unlike for deceit
it need not depend upon the presence of a second contract. See supra discussion at note
215. On the other hand, the modern recognition of the duty of disclosure of material
facts of a contract seems to fall within the prima facie tort doctrine. But breach of this
duty usually gives rise only to the remedy of rescission. See P.S. ATIYAH, supra note 136,
at 219. This relief inadequately admonishes the offeror. See supra note 139. For cases of
nondisclosure, modern courts therefore favor reading into the contract an implied term
such as a warranty, the breach of which supports more flexible contractual remedies. See
P.S. ATIYAH, supra, at 219-20. I surmise that this gambit of finding an implied
contractual term will not be taken by the courts here where the circumstances are closer
to misdisclosure, and therefore deceit, than to nondisclosure. See supra note 136. But if
the courts articulate a theory of prima facie tort, the inadequate remedy of rescission, as
in nondisclosure, must be avoided as the only relief if the doctrine is to be useful. "
252. Irrespective of the theory, if the offeror is found liable for the unenforceable
term, he may look to his attorney or the publisher of the form contract for recompense
under the doctrine of prima facie tort. There are suggestions that the giving of bad
advice, if malicious, may be actionable. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 256 U.S. 350, 358 (1921); Musso v. Miller, 265 A.D. 57, 58-59,
38 N.Y.S.2d 51, 53 (App. Div. 1942).
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ings, 253 abuse of process, 254 the intentional infliction of emotional
distress, 255 negligence, 256 and even defamation. 257 Some of these
may avoid the special twist in finding compensable damages but of-
fer no relief in an action directly against the silent partners of the
offeror, viz., his attorney, trade association or the publisher of the
form contract.
One other theory ought to be mentioned briefly. It ultimately
may turn out to be the primary remedial instrument if the purely
common law ones stumble on the mentioned hurdles and the legis-
latures and administrative tribunals make proper overtures. This is
the doctrine of implied rights, a hybrid of common law actions and
statutory remedies. 2 58 It arises when a legislative enactment or ad-
ministrative regulation creates a standard of conduct without pro-
viding an applicable remedy for dereliction. A court, under the
proper circumstances, will supply an appropriate remedy. 259 Essen-
tial to the implication of rights "is whether this remedy is consistent
with the legislative provision, appropriate for promoting its policy
and needed to assure its effectiveness." 260 Without further discus-
sion it will be noted in passing that there are already many legisla-
253. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1965) with id. § 674; see W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 92, §§ 119-20; Note, Unfounded Litigation, supra note
109, at 743; Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 109. The offeror may, for example,
bring an action in bad faith against the offeree on the basis of an unenforceable term.
254. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1965); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 92, § 121.
255. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 92, §§ 12, 54.
256. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 281-284 (1965); W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 92, §§ 28, 30.
257. Not only personal defamation but also the related tort known by various titles,
including "slander of title," "disparagement of property," "slander of goods," or
"injurious falsehood." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 623A (1965); W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 92, §§ 111, 128.
258. Among its other labels are "implied cause of action" and "statutory tort." See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A (1965); S. MERMIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM 271-74 (2d ed. 1982); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 92, § 36; Frankel,
Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553 (1981); McMahon & Rodos,Judicial Implication
of Private Causes of Action: Reappraisal and Retrenchment, 80 DIcK. L. REV. 167, 168-87
(1976). Deterrence of improper behavior by means of the plaintiff's role as private
attorney general is one justification for implying rights. SeeJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 432-34 (1964).
259. For the test of these circumstances, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A
(1965).
260. Id. § 874A comment h.
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tive and quasilegislative standards that are ripe for application to the
problem of unenforceable terms. 261
III. CONCLUSION
The practice of knowingly including unenforceable contract or
lease terms has gone on all around you without your being aware of
it. Don't be ashamed; it is quite beneath your notice. It provides,
nonetheless, an adequate excuse to examine a narrow problem from
a broad perspective. Some of the conclusions, however tentative,
are here collected.
From a moral point of view, the practice appears to operate at the
fringe of the usual notions of fairness; my readings place it outside
the fuzzy line of acceptability. The deontological, Kantian argu-
ments, largely a matter of armchair logic, push it well beyond the
line. The teleological, utilitarian arguments are less univocal, as
they will nearly always be, for the felicific calculus is mainly a matter
of empirically mapping the pervasive rippling effects of the question
at hand and measuring and balancing their magnitudes. The prac-
tice whipping up no tidal waves to make further inquiry moot, in
principle, drily logical speculation just won't do. But, as sanctified
by the long tradition of law professors unwilling (unable?) to budge
from the armchair, an inward look at some of the "good reasons"
261. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West Supp. 1985). In an acerbic
column, the editor of the California State Bar Journal wrote the following about this
code section:
[T]he California Supreme Court has held that section 17200 prohibits
Ianything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the
same time is forbidden by law.' . . . Your imagination should not be
constrained by what the law specifically forbids, however. Section 17200
prohibits 'unfair or fraudulent' business practices as well as those which
are 'unlawful.' . . . To be 'unfair' within this broad standard, a practice
need not deceive anyone...; that the practice offends a judge's fine
sensibilities would seem enough.
Chilton, Editor's Viewpoint, 55 CAL. ST. BARJ. 348, 348 (1980) (citations omitted).
Some courts have already applied this theory to deceptive practices. See, e.g., Sellinger
v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 110 Ariz. 573, 521 P.2d 1119 (1974) (private right
of action for deceptive practices created by inference from Consumer Fraud Act);
Laczko v.Jules Meyers, Inc., 276 Cal. App. 2d 293, 80 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1969) (violation of
statute making unlawful the manipulation of automobile odometer is actionable despite
fact that statute provides no specific civil remedy); Rice v. Snarlin, Inc., 131 Ill. App. 2d
434, 266 N.E.2d 183 (1970) (Consumer Fraud Act inferentially authorizes private cause
of action against seller engaged in unlawful practice). Apropos of our problem, deter-
rence of the defendant's conduct, not merely redress of the plaintiff's injury, has been
recognized by some courts as a purpose of this action. See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964) (civil damages in action under Securities Exchange Act
serve both to provide relief to shareholder and to encourage compliance with proxy
requirements); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1916) (purpose of Safety
Appliance Act is remedial as well as penal).
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likely to flow from the consequences of abolishing the practice,
many, if not all, things considered, permits one to speculate drily
anyway. In the end, there is little moral to say on behalf of the
practice.
Not to be out of fashion, a microeconomic analysis was attempted.
From it came the one conclusion that animates much of the dreary
science: the practice of including unenforceable terms appears inef-
ficient; the transaction costs will be lower if the offeror is duty-
bound not to mislead the offeree regarding the state of the law by
knowingly including an unenforceable term. Beyond this question
of dollars, sense was looked for in a sociological analysis of the prac-
tice. The espousal of the "rugged individualism" that gets so many
politicians elected nowadays, argues, at first glance, against the pro-
tection of the offeree so unself-reliant as to take the offeror at his
implicit word. Upon a second glance, something can be said for less
than complete self-reliance, including a possible increase in trustful-
ness and trustworthiness. Moreover, a remedy for the offeree allows
him self-reliantly to take on the misleading offeror in the courts,
whereas without it he is left helpless despite his rational ("efficient")
choice to take the terms at face value. A remedy for being taken in
on the state of the law may, on the other hand, undermine the in-
centive to be conversant in the law. The economics of reliance upon
the offeror's implied assertions of law, however, make it reasonable
to rely; thus in providing a remedy, we need not worry about en-
couraging the populace to be foolishly ignorant. A reminder of the
dynamic process of the growth of the law cautions us against unduly
inhibiting offerors from including terms of questionable enforce-
ability, or even those of doubtless unenforceability that may be ripe
for reconsideration. A legal remedy being a governmental function,
it may give occasion for an increase in the government's power,
although the cringes of libertarians may be stilled somewhat by the
knowledge that the power is constrained by the "mete-wand of the
law." Finally, until the legal doctrine proscribing the practice is
well-established, the uncertainties ofjudicial outcomes give rise to
costs to individual parties and the community purse.
Standing back to survey these moral, economic and sociological
considerations, they strike one as favoring overall a legal remedy.
In looking to the law for its wisdom, it is first noticed that the com-
mon law courts have not developed a general remedy partially due
to the peculiarity that, from one perspective, the consequence of
this deceptive practice is to leave the offeree, at the time of con-
tracting, with rights greater than he had reason, in light of his igno-
rance regarding enforceability, to expect. The damages often are
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obscure. For this and other reasons the problem has fallen within
the interstices of the most readily apparent common law actions (de-
ceit and prima facie tort) as well as all others. Even if there is a
cause of action, its costs compared to the recovery will often deter a
victim from bringing it without the availability of extraordinary dam-
ages. They are granted quite restrictively. If a general remedy is
called for, it may be up to the legislatures to provide it. Not only
might they consider statutory causes of action, but also fines, licens-
ing and other administrative restrictions, and criminal sanctions.
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APPENDIX
The elaboration of one instance of the knowing inclusion of unen-
forceable contract terms may be edifying. It was brought to my at-
tention by my colleague Norman Poser, formerly the executive vice-
president of the American Stock Exchange, for which I thank him. I
quote from a journal column by him to pinpoint the issue and note
the response on behalf of the offending industry:
A recent Securities and Exchange Commission rule propo-
sal designed to ensure that customers are informed of their
rights to litigate, rather than arbitrate, disputes with their bro-
kerage firms has raised a minor storm of criticism from the
industry ... for allegedly not supporting arbitration to settle
customer-broker disputes....
Each of the federal securities acts contains a section stating
that any agreement requiring a person to waive any provisions
of the law is void. This is for the protection of investors....
Thirty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in the
leading case of Wilko v. Swan 262 that these antiwaiver provi-
sions also protect an investor's right to enforce the securities
laws by suing in federal court. Hence the typical clause in a
customer's written agreement with his brokerage firm that any
future disputes will be submitted to binding arbitration is un-
enforceable to the extent it covers disputes arising under the
securities laws. On the other hand, such an agreement is per-
fectly valid if it covers other types of customer-broker disputes
or agreements to arbitrate a dispute after the dispute has
arisen.
Despite the ruling in the Wilko case, many brokerage firms
still use customer agreement forms that require all future dis-
putes to be submitted to arbitration. Although a customer
who signs such an agreement is not bound by its unenforce-
able provision, a customer who does not consult an attorney
may believe that arbitration is his only recourse.
The present SEC rule proposal simply states that any agree-
ment that provides for the arbitration of future disputes must
include a disclosure that 'arbitration cannot be compelled with
respect to disputes arising under the federal securities
laws.'. ..
It is not too difficult to understand why this disclosure re-
quirement, which simply makes customers aware of their ex-
isting rights, has been the target of such severe industry
criticism. Clearly there is a fear that its effect will be to in-
crease the volume of litigation.
262. 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (footnote added).
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[The competing values and considerations are discussed.]
Some of the persons who commented on the SEC rule pro-
posal have even suggested that the agency ask Congress to re-
peal the Wilko rule in order to expressly validate clauses in
customer agreements requiring arbitration of all future dis-
putes. Since a customer has little choice but to sign the agree-
ment form presented to him, the effect of such legislation
would be to exclude from the federal courts all controversies
between brokers and their customers, including those involv-
ing alleged violations of the securities laws. The suggestion
contains an element of pipe-dreaming, and it's doubtful the
SEC would accept it.
As of this writing, the SEC has not yet announced a decision
whether or not to adopt its proposed disclosure rule. If the
rule is adopted, it is unlikely to change much, except to en-
lighten a few unsophisticated investors of their right of access
to the courts. For most people the question whether to litigate
or arbitrate is chiefly one of cost. For this reason, the SEC
proposal seems more of a tempest in a teapot than a contro-
versial issue for the industry to fight.2 63
The proposed SEC rule was adopted. 264
Another of my colleagues, Roberta S. Karmel, formerly a commis-
sioner of the SEC, has quite a different view of this regulation. She
began a journal column:
The Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) contin-
ued campaign against arbitration of disputes between broker-
dealers and their customers is difficult to understand. It defies
sound public policy which should be headed in the direction of
endorsing alternatives to judicial resolution of disputes.
Moreover, it does not appear to be based on any widespread
dissatisfaction by investors or others with the existing legal
263. Poser, Litigate? Or Arbitrate?: A Proposed SEC Rule Ensuring Investors Know They Can
Sue in Disputes with Brokers Raises a Minor Storm of Protest, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG. 12
(Sept. 13, 1983).
In a private letter to Poser dated November 8, 1983, Mr. William J. Fitzpatrick,
General Counsel of the Securities Industries Association, responded to the article with
two counterarguments: first, the SEC had previously agreed to the adequacy of a W1ilko
disclosure in a booklet given to those seeking arbitration and thus the rule proposal was
considered an inappropriate reversal of a reasonable resolution; and, second, sufficient
notice exists "without the necessity of redoing each and every outstanding margin
agreement in existence today." [What about future agreements? For those in the
immediate future, the SEC would allow the firms to save trees (and money) by using the
existing form contracts with disclosure riders attached. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2(b)
(1986).] The industry does not object to disclosure, "[it is simply a question of
opposing bad unnecessary regulation. I personally thought that the days of needless
rules were behind us, but to my sorrow I find out they are not."
264. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1986).
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framework relating to arbitration, but rather comes from an
ideological attachment to litigation and a bureaucratic mindset
that refuses to address the realities of customer complaint
lawsuits.2 65
Karmel's objection is that arbitration is quite adequate to deal with
whatever disputes there are, and can do so more cheaply and expe-
ditiously. The SEC ought not to "improperly cast doubt on the effi-
cacy and fairness of arbitration. '" 266
Karmel's and the industry's objections against the right of cus-
tomers to litigate may all be true, although Poser makes some telling
counterpoints in his column, but the law clearly establishes the
right. As long as that right exists, warranted or not, it is deceptive
and unfair knowingly to mislead the customer into believing to the
contrary by means of a (partially) unenforceable contract term. Any
justification of the suppression of information about the right on the
grounds that the right ought to be abolished strikes me as contrary
to sound morals and, arguably, economically and sociologically un-
sound.267 A disclaimer of the full enforceability of the term appear-
ing on the inside cover of a booklet handed to customers who seek
arbitration is unlikely to offset entirely the prior false impression. If
this is not the case, why would the industry object to revising the
contract term, prospectively if not retroactively, to avoid the
misinformation? 268
265. Karmel, supra note 112, at 1.
266. Id. at 2.
267. Why should the customers be made the instrumental losers (that is, means to the
end) in the struggle between the industry and the SEC? Notice, however, that the
dissenters did not explicitly argue against the SEC rule regarding disclosure as a means
of avoiding Wilko.
268. As an update to this controversy over Wilko, it should be noted that Wilko was
severely limited in Shearson/America Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987),
where the Court found that "Wilko must be understood, therefore, as holding that the
plaintiff's waiver of the 'right to select the judicial forum' . . . was unenforceable only
because arbitration was judged inadequate to enforce the statutory rights." Id. at 2338.
[T]he mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion
in 1953 is difficult to square with the assessment of arbitration that has
prevailed since that time. . . [Thus] [w]hile stare decisis concerns may
counsel against upsetting Wilko's contrary conclusion under the
Securities Act, we refuse to extend Wilko's reasoning to the Exchange Act
in light of these intervening regulatory developments.
Id. at 2341.
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